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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Public discourse on immigration in the European Union 
 
On 1 January 2014 Greece assumed its six-month presidency of the European 
Union and officially declared that it would “have to deal with huge problems and 
great challenges” [Riegert, 2014]. The Greek presidency has therefore 
formulated three policy areas of its priority focus which have the crucial 
importance for the Community – Growth-Jobs-Cohesion; Further integration of 
the EU-eurozone and Migration-Borders-Mobility [Greek presidency, 2013:6]. 
That is how the official programme of the presidency explains the key objectives 
of the latter field of action: 
 
Instability in the European periphery, together with the perseverance 
of the causes that lead to immigration flows into Europe, increase these 
flows and place an extra burden on EU member states, in a period of 
economic crisis, when all forces and efforts should be focused on 
reforms aiming at safeguarding stability and revitalizing growth. This 
burden falls mainly on the EU member-states that are on Europe’s 
external borders, as well as on those heavily affected by recession 
and unemployment. In this context, the Greek Presidency will 
concentrate its efforts at highlighting the positive aspects of a 
comprehensive migration management to the benefit of boosting growth 
and will spare no efforts in promoting all dimensions of migration and 
mobility policies. At the same time, action is envisaged to tackle the 
problems arising from illegal1 migration in economy, social 
cohesion and political stability [Greek presidency, 2013:7] 
 
This extract reflects several essential points which are observed in the public 
discourse on immigration in the European Union. First of all, immigration in 
                                                          
1
 In this dissertation the term “undocumented” will be applied for referring to immigrants who enter/ 
try to enter the territory of the European Union without required authorization. The terms “illegal” and 
“irregular” will be used only in quotations and in the expression “FRONTEX’ discourse on illegal 
immigration” in order to emphasize the terminology used by the agency. The terminological difference 
is discussed in detail on p. 49. 
5 
 
general is presented as a “burden” for the Member States which can potentially 
impede the economic reforms and have a serious impact on the level of 
economic prosperity and welfare of European citizens. Secondly, one can 
observe a clear separation and contraposition between the European Union’s 
population and the immigrants from the “European periphery”. Finally,  
special emphasis is made on the problem of “illegal migration” which presents a 
danger for the Community’s political, economic and social spheres. Taking all 
this into consideration, the Greek presidency has suggested to pay special 
attention to “fighting illegal migration, with a focus on readmission and return as 
well as on fighting human trafficking and building institutional capacities for 
better border management” [Greek presidency, 2013:7].  
 
The problem of immigration in general and undocumented migration in 
particular is one of rather uncommon examples when the opinion of the majority 
of citizens of the European Union unconditionally coincides with the official 
position of the Community’s policy makers. According to the international survey 
conducted in 2011, over 65% of British, Italians and Spaniards polled strongly 
or partly agreeing that “there are too many immigrants” in their countries and 
that immigration had a “very of fairly negative impact” [EurActiv, 2011].  
The majority of people who took part in the survey in most EU countries agreed 
as well that immigration had made it more difficult for citizens to find 
employment and "placed too much pressure on public services," such as health 
care and education [Ibid]. This reflection of public opinion can be considered as 
an indispensable element of the official immigration policy of the EU, taking into 
account that “the shaping of migration policies is the result of a complex 
process in which public opinion and the various participants in the public debate 
play a significant role” [OECD, 2010:116]. The overwhelming rejection of 
immigration processes by European citizens arises a question on the reasons of 
this unacceptance and the information sources which exert influence on this 
opinion.  
 
This question refers us to the conception of social contructionism which strives 
for defining the nature and construction of knowledge in order to determine how 
it emerges and how it comes to have the significance for society [Andrews, 
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2012].  In this context, Burr (2003) has suggested that social understandings 
and identities originate not from inside the person but from the social realm in 
which this person lives. In this case, specific knowledge is created by the 
interactions within society and then internalized by individuals through the 
medium of language [Berger and Luckman, 1991, cited in Andrews, 2012].   
Within the framework of social constructionism theory, language is therefore not 
an “unproblematic means of transmitting thoughts and feelings” but rather a tool 
which “makes thoughts possible by constructing concepts” [Andrews, 2012]. 
This means that language has the capacity to predate concepts and shape 
certain understandings and ideas of its addressees in the context of the certain 
discourse. The term discourse in this case simultaneously indicates the 
represented ideas, which may come in a variety of forms as well as content, 
and the interactive processes by which these ideas are conveyed [Schmidt, 
2008:309].  
 
1.2 FRONTEX and its role in the public debates on undocumented 
migration 
 
The public discourse on illegal immigration in the European Union 
encompasses a great number of actors who participate in sharing their ideas 
and understandings of the situation and the measures which should be 
undertaken for effective control of the external borders of the EU – national 
governments, institutions of the EU, mass media, non-governmental 
organizations, human rights movements, etc. Among this multitude of actors, 
this dissertation suggests to focus attention on the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union (FRONTEX). The agency was created in 2004 
“with the main aim of supporting operational cooperation amongst EU Member 
States with regard to the management of the external borders” [Leonard, 
2011:2]. According to the President of the European Commission J.M. Barroso, 
FRONTEX as one of EU agencies is “an essential part of the EU and plays a 
key role in the implementation of its policies” and serves as a “satellite picking 
up signals on the ground, processing them, and beaming them back and forth” 
[FRONTEX, 1 December 2006]. Moreover, Mr. Barroso has considered as 
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“being of outmost importance” the fact that FRONTEX “through its activities 
contributes to making Europe closer to the European citizens and hopefully 
easier to understand” [Ibid]. Indeed, since the start of its operational activities in 
2005, FRONTEX has been regularly appealed to as an expert source in the 
framework of public debates on immigration and border control and has played 
an important role in border guard trainings and border patrol operations which 
have been always well covered in the media [Horsti, 2012:299].  
 
FRONTEX was created by Council Regulation EC 2007/2004 of 26 October 
2004 “with a view to improving the integrated management of the external 
borders of the Member States of the European Union” [Council of the European 
Union, 2004:349/3]. Article 2 of the Regulation determines the main tasks of the 
agency, which are as follows: (1) coordinating operational cooperation between 
the Member States regarding the management of external borders; (2) assisting 
the Member States in the training of national border guards, including 
establishing common training standards; (3) conducting risk analyses;  
(4) following up on developments in research relevant for the control and 
surveillance of external borders; (5) assisting the Member States when 
increased technical and operational assistance at external borders is required; 
and (6) assisting the Member States in organising joint return operations 
[Council of the European Union, 2004:349/4]. At the same time, the official web-
site of the agency contains the following information about its main activities: 
 - FRONTEX plans, coordinates, implements and evaluates joint naval, aerial 
and land operations conducted using the Member States’ staff and equipment 
at the external borders; 
- FRONTEX is responsible for developing common training standards and 
specialist tools for border guards and officers across the European Union; 
- FRONTEX collates and analyses intelligence on the ongoing situation at the 
external borders, which is compiled from border crossing points and other 
operational information as well as from the Member States and open sources 
including mass media and academic research; 
- FRONTEX serves as a platform to bring together Europe’s border-control 
personnel and the world of research and industry to bridge the gap between 
technological advancement and the needs of border control authorities; 
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- FRONTEX assists the Member States in coordinating their efforts in return of 
foreign nationals to their home countries and tries to maximise efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness while also ensuring that respect for fundamental rights and 
the human dignity of returnees is maintained at every stage [FRONTEX’ web-
site, Mission and Tasks].  
 
It should be mentioned that according to FRONTEX Executive Director  
I. Laitinen, the agency is above all coordinating body with very few executive 
powers, taking into account that it is dependent on executive political leadership 
of the European Commission and the Member States, does not have  
the capacity to make political decisions about launching operations and aims to 
facilitate co-operation between the Member States and with third countries 
[Laitinen, 2006]. Having no operational assets of its own, its major operations 
are dependent on contributions of resources by Member States [Neal, 
2009:347]. Indeed, the Regulation clearly defines that “while responsibility for 
the control and surveillance of external borders lies with the Member States,  
the Agency shall facilitate and render more effective the application of existing 
and future Community measures relating to the management of external 
borders” [Council of the European Union, 2004:349/3].  
 
The main mechanism of control on the activities of the agency by the European 
Commission and the Member States is the Management Board, to which 
FRONTEX Executive Director is accountable [Leonard, 2009:382].  
The Management Board of FRONTEX is composed of one representative of 
each Member State and two representatives of the European Commission, who 
are “appointed on the basis of their degree of high level relevant experience and 
expertise in the field of operational cooperation on border management” 
[Council of the European Union, 2004:349/7]. Each member of the Management 
Board has one vote, whereas the Executive Director has no vote, but can take 
part in the deliberations of the Board [Ibid]. The headquarters of the agency is 
situated in Warsaw.  
 
Thanks to its generally recognized reputation of a competent expert in the 
sphere of border control and through its active participation in the public 
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discourse on migration issues, the agency has obtained the possibility to share 
its vision and express its understandings of the discussed problems. It will be 
therefore pertinent to assume that through its discourse FRONTEX may have 
the capacity to transmit certain thoughts and to shape certain visions on the 
mentioned above issues among the audience of the discourse. In what follows, 
the review of existing literature on FRONTEX will be made in order to see 
whether this capacity of the agency has been already analysed by the scholars, 
and whether it may potentially empower FRONTEX and therefore contribute to 
reinforcing its role in the public discourse on illegal immigration and control of 
the external borders of the European Union.  
 
1.3 Literature review 
 
During almost ten years of its existence, FRONTEX has received a relatively 
limited amount of attention within academic writing [Burridge, 2012:11]. Indeed, 
the number of works dedicated specifically to various aspects of the agency’s 
activities and practices is rather small, especially in comparison with substantial 
attention and criticism of FRONTEX’ activities coming from human rights 
movements and non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, the scholars are 
paying even less attention to FRONTEX’ power analysis and usually include its 
elements in more general works in which FRONTEX serves as one of the 
examples but not as the principal object of studies. Thus, FRONTEX is often 
mentioned in the works on institutional structure of the European Union in the 
context of delegation of power to EU agencies (e.g. Barbieri, 2008; Busuoic, 
2013; Egeberg and Trondall, 2011; Groenleer, 2009; Wonka and Rittberger, 
2010). These works analyse the conditions of creation of the agencies, their 
accountability and the level of their independence from the national 
governments, the Council and the European Commission through the prism of 
institutional and regulatory power without, however, paying particular attention 
to FRONTEX. The scholars have also examined the role of FRONTEX in 
implementation of the concept of integrated border management and EU 
common policy on its external borders (Jorry, 2007; Kaunert, 2009; Monar, 
2006).  At the same time, it should be said that the first years of the agency’s 
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existence have not been marked with a sufficient number of research works 
dedicated to its role and activities.  
 
However, the last several years have demonstrated increased interest of the 
researchers in analyzing FRONTEX’ activities. In what follows, the most 
significant  of them will be briefly overviewed with a special focus on two 
aspects – power concepts applied by the scholars for their analysis and 
examination of the agency’s discursive strategies as a constitutive element of 
FRONTEX’ possible empowerment. The majority of works on FRONTEX are 
specifically concentrated on establishment and operational activities of the 
agency, especially in the context of securitization of migration (e.g. Pollak and 
Slominksi, 2009; Kasparek, 2010). While speaking about the agency’s power, 
the authors usually appeal to coercive power conception in FRONTEX’ 
operational activities. Thus, Leonard (2011) has analyzed the “contribution of 
the activities of FRONTEX (…) to the securitization of asylum and migration in 
Europe” by arguing that “all the main activities of the agency can be considered 
to be securitizing practices” [Leonard, 2011:1]. Being guided by the so-called 
“sociological” approach to securitization (Bigo, 1998; Balzacq, 2010) which 
“privileges the role of practices over that of discourses in securitization 
processes”, Leonard has not extended her research on other types of the 
agency’s activities and has limited the scope of her work only by studying 
FRONTEX joint operations. The author has emphasized that “although 
FRONTEX does not have overall responsibility to organise joint return 
operations”, its operational activities seriously contribute to securitization of 
asylum and migration in Europe altogether with its other activities as training of 
national border-guards, risk analysis and the follow-up on border security-
related research [Leonard, 2011:29]. Even if the author has not explicitly 
highlighted the power aspect in her analysis of FRONTEX’ activities, she has 
however devoted a considerable attention to description of FRONTEX joint 
operations by evaluating their results as “semi-militarisation of border controls 
and thereby a securitization of migration flows given the traditional role of the 
military in addressing security issues” [Leonard, 2011:17].  
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Coercive measures applied by FRONTEX during maritime operations and 
forced returns of undocumented migrants have been also analysed by several 
authors (e.g. Klepp, 2008; Papastavridis, 2010; Dunwald, 2012). Carrera (2007) 
has analysed the activities of FRONTEX in the context of development of the 
EU model of integrated border management and common immigration policy by 
considering the agency as the “main institutional instrument responsible for 
making the EU border management agenda work on the ground” [Carrera, 
2007:1].  According to the author, the agency’s main function is to join under its 
umbrella “coercive measures and surveillance technology, as well as the 
deployment of an improved system of coordinated actions” between the 
Member States in the management of the external borders [Carrera, 2007:1].  In 
his work, Carrera has criticized a high level of secrecy, as well as a lack of 
transparency and democratic accountability of the agency which should have 
been addressed as a “matter of urgency” before further development of 
FRONTEX’ competences and operational tools [Carrera, 2007:2]. By the 
example of FRONTEX joint return operations Hera I and Hera II undertaken in 
the Canary islands, Carrera has pointed out two main manifestations of the 
agency’s coercive power – “externalization of EU border control2 and prevention 
of irregular migration” in order to apprehend and detect the migrants’ boats 
[Carrera, 2007:21].  Taking into consideration possible implications for human 
rights as a result of “coercive control” undertaken by FRONTEX, Carrera makes 
a conclusion that the agency is a “body whose compliance with the principle of 
legality may be open to debate” [Carrera, 2007:27].   
 
Another attempt to analyse FRONTEX’ activities has been undertaken by 
Baldaccini (2010), who has focused his attention on sea joint operations 
conducted by FRONTEX in the context of “legal and jurisdictional aspects of 
maritime border control as operated by this Agency” [Baldaccini, 2010:229].  
The author has examined how FRONTEX’ coercive measures during sea 
operations correspond to operational plans of the European Union, Community 
law in this area and international obligations of the Member States. By stressing 
                                                          
2
 In the context of his work, by “externalization of EU border control” the author means “expansion of 
surveillance and coercive control to the African coasts” [Carrera, 2007:25]. In a more general sense, this 
notion can be relevant to any region beyond the borders of the EU implicated in FRONTEX’ operations.     
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the fact that “it is not clear how the guarantees and protections under the EU 
legal framework can be applied to joint border operations, or how compliance 
with international obligations with regard to the conduct of these operations” is 
assured, Baldaccini has argued that there are “special concerns for human 
rights protection in connection with FRONTEX-led sea operations” [Baldaccini, 
2010:229]. The author has considered FRONTEX’ accountability and control 
over its activities to be not sufficient, especially in the domain of respect to 
human rights during its joint operations. 
 
Some authors focus their attention on more specific domains of FRONTEX’ 
activities, like for example Burridge (2012) who has examined the functioning of 
Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) of FRONTEX as “emergency 
responses to migration at the external borders” in the context of integrated 
border management [Burridge, 2012:3]. The author argues that FRONTEX 
emergency operations can be used as justification for long-term or even 
permanent operations, and the expansion of border control practices through 
the presence of FRONTEX trained border guards operating across various 
Member States that possess an external border of the EU [Burridge, 2012:4]. It 
is noteworthy to mention, that in his research Burridge has decided to make a 
“discourse analysis of FRONTEX and European Commission policy documents, 
press releases and annual reports, as well as media reports” [Burridge, 
2012:13], but his work is concentrated on operational activities of the agency 
and therefore does not explain the agency’s capacity to shape key 
understandings and ideas through its discourse.  
 
One of the most comprehensive and fundamental works on FRONTEX, which 
has analysed creation, remit and practices of the agency, is the article of  
A. Neal (2009). The author has argued that “although the responses to 9/11 
issued by the key EU institutions made clear ‘securitizing’ links between 
terrorism, security, migration and borders, FRONTEX was not the outcome of 
that securitization, but rather of its failure” [Neal, 2009:334]. According to Neal, 
the agency “was established not on the basis of securitization, exceptional 
politics and urgency, but in response to the disintegration of a common EU 
response to migration, security and borders” [Neal, 2009:346]. The author has 
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partially examined the agency’s institutional and regulatory power through the 
modality of risk, which is for him the central concept for analysis of the agency’s 
activities in contrast to security and therefore securitisation. It should be said as 
well, that Neal is one of not numerous scholars who has included in his work on 
FRONTEX some elements of discourse analysis but in a rather limited scope. 
The author has paid particular attention to the conceptions of security and risk 
in the constitutive documents and publications of the agency in order to 
demonstrate the prevalence of the notion of risk in FRONTEX’ discourse. In the 
conclusion, Neal has suggested to consider the activities of the agency not in 
the context of securitization but more through the prism of Bigo’s [Bigo, 2002] 
concept of governmentality of unease which “offers a way to consider the linking 
of terrorism, security, migration and borders that does not assume the 
importance of a dramatic invocation of existential threats and exceptional 
measures” [Neal, 2009:352]. 
 
Institutional power of FRONTEX has been analysed in the work of Leonard 
(2009) in the framework of the agency’s activities and authorities. The author 
has analysed the institutional issues associated with the establishment and the 
work of FRONTEX with a particular focus on the question for what reasons the 
“Member States chose to create an agency, rather than establish another form 
of cooperation” [Leonard, 2009:371]. According to Leonard, the creation of 
FRONTEX was a “product of power struggles within the EU” [Leonard, 
2009:385], particularly between its three major bodies – the Council of the EU, 
the European Commission and the European Parliament. Leonard has 
analysed the establishment of FRONTEX in the context of delegation of powers 
and has paid particular attention to the mechanisms of control over FRONTEX’ 
activities. Arguing that “[every] decision to delegate essentially involves two 
choices – what powers to delegate and what institutional control mechanisms to 
craft”, Leonard has come to a conclusion that institutional capacities of 
FRONTEX are rather limited as the agency is under strict control of the Member 
States. The whole range of control mechanisms as accountability to the 
Management Board, budgetary control, reviews of activities, etc. are supposed 
to “avoid any unwanted “drifts” in the activities of FRONTEX” [Leonard, 
2009:385].  
14 
 
 
The work of Perkowski (2012) “assesses FRONTEX according to its own goals 
and values” and seeks to answer the question whether “FRONTEX’ working 
arrangements, practices and the implications thereof match the values and aims 
aspired to in its foundation” [Perkowski, 2012:4]. In a critical manner the author 
has argued  that “there are numerous tensions between fundamental values 
and the goals FRONTEX was set up to accomplish, which are demonstrated in 
its management as well as operational work” [Perkowski, 2012:5]. It is important 
to mention that Perkowski has paid attention to strengthening of FRONTEX’ 
human rights discourse as an attempt to resolve the tensions between the 
declared goals of the establishment of the agency and its activities which cause 
considerable violations of human rights.  
 
In fact, it is only in last few years that the scholars have started to take an 
interest in the analysis of FRONTEX’ discourse on illegal immigration. Despite 
the absence of comprehensive works in this domain, the article of Horsti (2012) 
on humanitarian discourse in FRONTEX’ public communication deserves 
special attention as the author has for the first time undertaken the detailed 
analysis of the agency’s discursive strategies and practices  with the emphasis 
on victimization of migrants, criminalization of facilitators and humanitarian 
component in FRONTEX’ discourse (when the activities of the agency are 
presented as saving undocumented migrants’ lives), which is considered by 
Horsti as an attempt to provide a “justification for different types of 
security practices, including high-technology surveillance mechanisms, and as a 
justification to spend member states’ resources on FRONTEX” [Horsti, 
2012:309]. At the same time, the work of Horsti has several reservations which 
have not permitted to effectuate a more profound analysis of FRONTEX’ 
discursive techniques. First of all, the author has chosen as the main source for 
analysis the agency’s press releases without resorting to examination of other 
types of FRONTEX’ documents and publications which give a rich basis for 
analysis. Moreover, Horsti has not drawn the connection between the agency’s 
discourse and its empowerment by the relevant discursive techniques contained 
in it. However, this work can serve as a good starting point for a more 
comprehensive analysis of the agency’s discourse.  
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1.4 Research question and arguments 
 
The review of the available literature dedicated to different aspects of creation, 
activities and role of FRONTEX has clearly demonstrated that the analysis of 
the agency’s power in examined works is rather limited as it is undertaken only 
in the framework of trichotomy of concepts of coercive, institutional and 
regulatory power. Most researchers have focused their attention either on 
analysis of FRONTEX’ operational activities or on the place of FRONTEX in the 
institutional system of the European Union. The analysed power concepts are 
traditionally attributed to FRONTEX by all the scholars even if they happen to 
disagree in the question of the extent of these types of power possessed by the 
agency. At the same time, this trichotomic approach does not disclose all the 
nuances of FRONTEX’ power, as the scholars are frequently neglecting other 
aspects of FRONTEX’ power and this disregard does not allow them to see the 
full extent of influence which is exercised by the agency on shaping certain 
understandings and constructing certain problems through its discourse on 
illegal immigration. This dissertation suggests that this occurs because of the 
limited conception of power which is applied by the researchers while analyzing 
FRONTEX’ activities and that more comprehensive power analysis should be 
undertaken in order to observe the full scale of the impact made by the agency. 
Therefore, this work attempts to alleviate the gap in the research on power 
analysis of FRONTEX and offers to focus attention on the least examined in the 
existing literature type of its power – power to create certain truths, problems 
and their solutions through its discourse on illegal immigration. This type of 
power can be well illustrated by a well-known expression of M. Foucault: 
 
Power is everywhere: not because it embraces everything, but because it 
comes from everywhere. Power is not an institution, nor a structure, nor a 
possession [Foucault, 1998:93] 
 
The type of FRONTEX’ power which will be analysed in this dissertation is not 
similar with coercive, institutional or regulatory power which are traditionally 
analysed in the existing literature. It is not “possessed” by the actor and cannot 
be realized directly as coercive measures or institutional authorities as it 
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functions at the more invisible level. Using the term which has been introduced 
by A. Leander (see p. 21), this concept can be defined as epistemic power and 
consists in construction of certain ideas, understandings and truths through the 
public discourse. Taking this into account, the research question of the 
dissertation can be formulated as follows: 
 
By what means is epistemic power of FRONTEX constituted in its discourse on 
illegal immigration? 
 
Having as a depart point the key thesis of the conception of social 
contructionism that identities and understandings are created through the 
medium of language (see p. 6), the dissertation argues that epistemic power of 
FRONTEX is constituted through various discursive strategies, techniques and 
devices which are used in the agency’s discourse on illegal immigration.  
 
In order to answer the research question, in what follows this dissertation 
presents the detailed analysis of FRONTEX’ documents and publications with 
the objective to define the main tools, which have the potential to empower the 
agency through its discourse. Section 2 demonstrates the necessity to 
undertake a more comprehensive power analysis of FRONTEX than it has been 
done before in the existing literature to reveal the full extent of the agency’s 
power of shaping understandings and ideas among the audience of its 
discourse. It defines the conception of epistemic power and examines its main 
features. Section 3 offers the profound analysis of FRONTEX’ discourse in 
order to demonstrate the key discursive strategies, practices and techniques 
used by the authors of the agency’s documents for constructing truths and 
ideas in the way which is advantageous for the agency. Finally, Section 4 
contains discussion of the effects of the analysed discursive elements and 
provides the conclusions on whether they contribute to constitution of the 
agency’s epistemic power.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. Towards a broader concept of power 
 
Being one of the most central and at the same time contentious concepts in 
social and political sciences, power and its analysis have always attracted 
attention of numerous scholars and researchers [Béland, 2006:1]. The thesis on 
the necessity of broader power analysis, which allows examining some new 
facets of power which have not been studied before, has become the central 
idea of one of the basic academic works in this domain – Power: A Radical 
View by Steven Lukes. In his book, which spawned a large debate among 
conceptual theorists, Lukes has addressed a fundamental question for scholars 
of political science – how to think about power theoretically and how to study it 
empirically [Lorenzi, 2006:87]. The principal argument used by Lukes is that 
while analyzing power realized by an actor, it is necessary to think about power 
broadly and to pay attention to those power aspects that are least accessible to 
observation [Lorenzi, 2006:88]. The author emphasizes on the fact that the 
effects of power are not exhausted by decision making and agenda construction 
but can possibly operate at a deeper and more invisible level [Swartz, 2005:2]. 
In the case of FRONTEX, this argument allows to broaden the extent of 
analysis of the agency’s power and to step aside from examination of 
FRONTEX’ operational activities and institutional authorities which present a 
traditional subject of studies, as it has been shown in the previous chapter.  
 
Notwithstanding the prevalence of the conception of domination (in both 
coercive and non-coercive forms), which does not have direct link with the type 
of power examined in this dissertation, Lukes’ work contains a theoretical 
substantiation which can serve as a valuable starting point for analysis of 
FRONTEX’ epistemic power. It is noteworthy to mention, however, that 
domination is defined by Lukes as “the capacity to secure compliance to 
domination through the shaping of beliefs and desires, by imposing internal 
constraints under historically changing circumstances” [Swartz, 2005:3]. 
Therefore, the scholar has admitted that the actor’s power analysis should 
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include the aspect of exerting influence on forming certain understandings and 
ideas.   
 
Lukes has formulated several basic rules which were supposed to assist in 
avoiding a “limited” approach to power analysis.  First of all, a broad definition of 
power according to Lukes should not commit the effect, called by the author 
“exercise fallacy” – this means that power analysis should not be limited by 
focusing to the visible exercise of power [Swartz, 2005:2]. One needs rather to 
think of power as a capacity or ability that may or may not be explicitly activated 
in given situations [Ibid]. Furthermore, according to Lukes the definition of 
power should not be limited to only asymmetric power relations (“power over”) 
which is characterized by direct domination of one subject over the other [Ibid]. 
The author has broadened the sphere of power analysis by including also the 
concept which can be called “power to”. Being influenced by the ideas of  
M. Foucault, Lukes has emphasized that power should not be presented 
exclusively in zero sum terms because it has the capacity not only to repress 
(power over) but also to create new significant effects (power to) [Swartz, 
2005:3].  Lukes’ work is particularly based on Foucault’s idea about productive 
dynamics and effects of power:   
 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative 
terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it 
‘conceals’. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of 
objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be 
gained of him belong to this production [Foucault, 1979:194] 
 
In order to create an effective and comprehensive model of power analysis, 
Lukes has singled out three power dimensions or views, each one with its own 
distinguishing features. According to the one-dimensional view, power is 
conceived of as intentional and active: it should thus be measured through the 
study of its exercise with the focus on decision-making behavior [Lorenzi, 
2006:90]. This approach is mostly based on R. Dahl’s work “Who Governs? 
Democracy and Power in an American City” [Dahl, 1961] and is, therefore, 
related to “the study of concrete, observable behavior” of actors [Lukes, 
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2005:17]. Lukes considers the first view of power as very limited, taking into 
account that power is not only reflected in concrete decisions and, thus, 
proceeds to the second dimension which origins from the idea that individuals 
or groups can limit decision-making to relatively non-controversial issues by 
influencing community values and political procedures and rituals [Lorenzi, 
2006:90]. Moreover, the two-dimensional model suggests that power may also 
be located in the capacity to create or reinforce barriers to the public airing of 
policy conflicts [Bachrach and Baratz, 1970:8]. This model, therefore, examines 
both decision-making and non-decision-making – decisions designed to avoid 
the emergence of values and interests contrary to those of the decision-maker 
[Lorenzi, 2006:91]. According to Lukes, the two-dimensional view of power is 
limited in that it focuses only on observable conflicts, whether overt or covert – 
the author claims that A can also exercise power over B by influencing, shaping, 
or determining his wants and preferences [Ibid]. That is why Lukes has 
elaborated the third dimension of power which is particularly important for the 
power analysis which will be undertaken in this dissertation. Third dimension of 
power suggested by Lukes is ideological in nature and is based on the following 
question formulated by the author: 
 
Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to 
whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, 
cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the 
existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative 
to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they 
value it as divinely ordained and beneficial?  [Lukes, 2005:28] 
 
Therefore, in order to undertake a more comprehensive power analysis of 
FRONTEX, addressing to the third dimension of power will allow finding an 
appropriate model of analysis which has not yet been captured by the existing 
literature because of the limited concept of power that they scholars have used.  
This model should give an opportunity to analyse the agency’s power on a 
“deeper and more invisible level” than it has been done in the literature before. 
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2.2 Conception of epistemic power 
 
Lukes’ third dimension of power has become the basis for the work of  
A. Leander on private military companies (PMCs) in which the author argues 
that emergence of PMCs has shifted the location of this power from  
the public/state to the private/market and, even more significantly, from the civil 
to the military sphere [Leander, 2005:803]. In order to demonstrate this shift, 
Leander has examined in what way PMCs can shape security understandings 
of key actors and hence their interests and preferences [Ibid].  Paying attention 
to the fact that PMCs have gained considerable power over security 
understandings and discourses, Leander mentions that they also increasingly 
shape which issues and problems are turned into existential threats 
(securitized) and which kind of reaction is to be considered more appropriate 
[Leander, 2005:804]. The following passage explains Leander’s logic and 
introduces the key term which will be used in this dissertation for FRONTEX’ 
power analysis – epistemic power: 
 
Power analysis needs to include the indirect effects PMCs can have on other 
actors’ interests by influencing their understanding of security. This asks for 
an analysis of how the relevant actors consciously try to influence security 
discourses. Here, this power to affect the meaning in discourses is called, for 
lack of another term, epistemic power, since it works through and by affecting 
the knowledge of actors [Leander, 2005:811] 
 
Epistemic power according to Leander, thus, consists in the agent’s capacity to 
shape certain understandings of other actors by influencing the relevant 
discourses in order to affect the knowledge of the audience. The author, 
however, fails to define the exact reason of choosing the term epistemic and 
mentions that this choice was stipulated by the “lack of another term”. In order 
to substantiate the use of the notion epistemic in this dissertation, it is 
noteworthy to refer to the notions of knowledge and epistemes in various 
interpretations of power effects. The first reference point here is Foucault’s 
formulation of power/knowledge nexus: 
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No body of knowledge can be formed without a system of communications, 
records, accumulation and displacement which is in itself a form of power and 
which is linked, in its existence and functioning, to the other forms of power. 
Conversely, no power can be exercised without the extraction, 
appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge. On this level, there is 
not knowledge on one side and society on the other, or science and the state, 
but only the fundamental forms of knowledge/power [Foucault cited in Sheridan 
1980: 283]  
 
Therefore, power can be characterized as a “disposition …that depends on 
knowledge” and its capacity to be productive is often followed by fixing certain 
meanings [Adler and Bernstein, 2005:294]. At the same time, the notion of 
knowledge rests rather vague and broad. One of the most well-aimed definitions 
of knowledge in this context has been given by Adler and Bernstein: 
 
Knowledge is the cumulative set of normative, ideological, technical, and 
scientific understandings that individuals carry in their heads, and that may be 
stored in books, libraries, and technical plans and technologies [Adler and 
Bernstein, 2005:295] 
 
Power analysis of the actor undertaken in the framework of knowledge 
distribution appears to be in this context quite limited, as in this case the matter 
would concern only some precise information or well-known truths which cannot 
really demonstrate the extent of power of the actor. Effectuating more profound 
analysis demands therefore operating with more comprehensive notions. In 
their work, Adler and Bernstein examine the conception of epistemes which 
present an integral part of knowledge but possess more distinct and precise 
meaning. According to the authors, epistemes are the “background 
intersubjective knowledge – collective understandings and discourse – that 
adopt the form of human dispositions and practices that human beings use to 
make sense of the world” [Adler and Bernstein, 2005:295]. Epistemes, 
therefore, distinct from knowledge in its general form, have much stronger 
“interpretation” side – discursive practices and techniques aimed at shaping 
certain ideas and understandings among the audience do not have the features 
of well-known truths or facts. In this case, analysis of epistemic power 
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successfully corresponds to Lukes’ appeal for examining the aspects of power 
which are “least accessible to observation” at the “more invisible level”  
(see p. 18).     
 
Adler and Bernstein compare epistemes with “bubbles within which people 
happen to live, the way people construe their reality, their basic understanding 
of the causes of things, their normative beliefs, and their identity, the 
understanding of self in terms of others” [Adler and Bernstein, 2005:296]. At the 
same time, the authors emphasize the fact that epistemes are constituted by 
social relations and agents and, therefore, have the capacity to endow them 
with the authority to determine valid knowledge. In this sense, epistemic power 
of the agent has the potential to construct social reality and enable the actor to 
exert influence of shaping certain understandings and ideas of the audience.  
Paying particular attention to productive capacities of the analysed type of 
power, Adler and Bernstein define epistemic power as the form of productive 
power exercised through epistemes, possessing, therefore, the major features 
of the latter [Adler and Bernstein, 2005:294]. Indeed, in this context epistemic 
power can be considered as a more subtle form of productive power which is 
operating not with knowledge in its general meaning, but with epistemes 
constituted by the agents and empowering them by giving them a capacity of 
shaping certain ideas and understandings.  
 
Therefore, it is important to mention here the principal general features of 
productive power which are equally applicable for epistemic power. Barnett and 
Duvall suggest that productive power presents a subject working through 
indirect social relations of constitution and define it as a “socially diffuse 
production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification” [Barnett and 
Duvall, 2005:3]. The analysed type of power, thus, is not reduced to the 
attributes, actions or interactions of the actors – in this case power works 
through socially diffused relations and enables the actors to have real impact on 
shaping some truths and knowledge among the addressed audience [Barnett 
and Duvall, 2005:9-10]. An important feature of this power concept is that 
relevant social processes are not controlled by specific actors but are more 
influenced through the meaningful practices of actors [Barnett and Duvall, 
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2005:20]. Epistemic power of an actor, therefore, can be described as forming 
ideas, understandings and truths through the system of epistemes expressed 
with the help of various discursive practices and techniques.  
 
The essential feature of productive power is that it is always characterized by 
discourse which can be described as the “social processes and the systems of 
knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and 
transformed” [Macdonell, 1986 cited in Barnett and Duvall, 2005:20]. 
Discourses in this sense represent, therefore, the special sites of social 
relations of power which “define the (im)possible, the (im)probable, the natural, 
the normal, what counts as problem” [Hayward, 2000:35]. Through the complex 
of epistemes the agent of power obtains the possibility to give its own 
definitions, meanings and interpretations which can significantly determine the 
discourse addressed to the audience. In this sense, the discourse has the 
primordial meaning as it can empower the actor with the help of epistemes 
constituted in it. The following definition given by Foucault presents a 
comprehensive explanation of the meaning of discourse in power analysis: 
 
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against 
it... We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby a 
discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a 
hindrance, a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an 
opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces 
it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it 
possible to thwart [Foucault, 1998:100-101]  
 
This definition stresses upon the multi-faceted role of the discourse which can 
empower the actor and at the same time presents a tool of its power. 
Furthermore, it mentions the probability of resistance to the possible influence 
of the discourse and, in particular, to the ideas which it contains. 
Therefore, integrating constitutive effects of discourse in the analysis of power 
and paying particular attention to epistemes created by the actor in the 
discourse may demonstrate how the actor is endowed with epistemic power 
through shaping public opinion with the help of application of various discursive 
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strategies. In the case of FRONTEX this means that the analysis of its 
epistemic power should include examination of its discourse on illegal 
immigration and exposure of the most important and the most frequently used 
discursive practices and techniques.   
 
In their work, Adler and Bernstein introduce two key notions which should be 
used for the analysis of epistemic power. The first one is called by them 
epistemic validity and is based on Habermas’s (1986) argument that valid 
knowledge claims should be grounded on comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, 
and rightness – an “ideal-speech situation” to which the agents should aspire 
[Adler and Bernstein, 2005:303]. At the same time, there is an important 
reservation regarding this demand because “often, political actors consciously 
use the power of language not only to lie (a primeval practice), or to create 
confusion between good and bad, but primarily to deliberately subvert the 
ontological assumptions of social reality” [Ibid].  The matter concerns intentional 
discursive techniques aimed at presenting certain ideas and thoughts in the way 
which is favorable for achieving the agent’s specific goals. It does not mean, 
however, that the agent intentionally provides false or erroneous information. In 
the terms of epistemic validity it signifies that the same ideas can be presented 
from the various points of view and with utilization of certain discursive 
techniques that exercise a significant effect on the interpretation of expressed 
thoughts and on formation of relevant understandings in the way which is 
advantageous for the actor.    
 
The second notion introduced by the authors is practical reason which relies on 
a pragmatist reading of rationality that is sensitive to contingent contexts [Adler 
and Bernstein, 2005:307]. This concept is based on the thesis that reasons 
derive from interpretive processes in which intersubjectively validated 
knowledge (epistemes) and normative understandings of fairness play a major 
role – in the mentioned above “ideal-speech situation”, described by Habermas, 
the use of epistemes requires “discursive validation” and must therefore be 
based on “good arguments” [Ibid]. In this context, practical reason is grounded 
on a “deliberative principle” which means that “any decision should be backed 
by arguments committed to values of rationality and impartiality” [Ibid]. 
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However, the conditions of “ideal-speech situation” in various discursive 
practices are more an exception than a rule. In order to effectuate the analysis 
of the agent’s epistemic power it is therefore important to examine if the 
arguments given in the discourse to support expressed thoughts and opinions 
are indeed impartial or whether, on the contrary, they are supposed to serve as 
a confirmation for their presentation from the point of view which is 
advantageous for the agent of power. 
 
Having in mind all the features of epistemic power, in what follows the detailed 
analysis of FRONTEX’ discourse on undocumented migration will be 
undertaken in order to reveal the main discursive strategies, practices and 
techniques which are used by the agency and which may potentially contribute 
to constituting FRONTEX’ epistemic power through the understandings and 
problems, shaped by the discourse.   
 
 
3. ANALYSIS OF FRONTEX’ DISCOURSE  
ON UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION 
 
3.1 Methods of analysis 
 
According to Gee, discourse analysis should consider the notion of discourse as 
“Discourse” with a capital D – this concept shows different ways in which the 
individuals integrate language and “non-language” elements, such as different 
ways of thinking, acting, interacting, valuing, feeling, believing, and 
appropriately using symbols, tools, and objects [Gee, 1999:13]. This can be 
made in order to enact and recognize different identities and activities, give the 
material world certain meanings, distribute social goods in a certain way, make 
certain sorts of meaningful connections in their experience, and privilege certain 
symbol systems and ways of knowing over others [Ibid]. Therefore, the analysis 
of FRONTEX’ discourse on undocumented migration should be undertaken in 
the way which will permit not only to reveal concrete discursive mechanisms, 
but also to examine how they manage to influence the audience’s perceptions, 
understandings and ideas on the issues of immigration and control of the 
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external borders of the European Union and thus how it contributes to 
constitutions of the agency’s epistemic power. With this objective, FRONTEX’ 
discourse analysis will include several components:   
 
1) discursive practices – the analysis is supposed to demonstrate the principal 
mechanisms, with the help of which the authors of FRONTEX’ documents and 
publications are formulating their ideas which can be then transformed into 
relevant epistemes and be transmitted to the audience through the agency’s 
discourse;  
 
2) rhetorical devises – FRONTEX’ discourse analysis will reveal several 
linguistic tools which are used by the authors of the documents for changing the 
nuances of meaning of certain understandings and ideas. The attention will be 
primarily paid to the use of metaphors (words or phrases that mean one thing 
and are used for referring to another thing in order to emphasize their similar 
qualities), hyperboles (way of emphasizing of something by describing it as far 
more extreme than it really is) and euphemisms (word or expression that people 
use when they want to talk about something unpleasant or embarrassing 
without mentioning the thing itself)3 in the agency’s documents and publications: 
 
3) audience of the discourse – the addressees of the ideas expressed in the 
discourse will be defined in order to understand what objectives are supposed 
to be achieved and what understandings and meanings are intended to be 
influenced by the discourse; 
 
4) context of the discourse – this component of the analysis will describe the 
interactions between FRONTEX and other actors who are addressed by the 
agency’s discourse and illustrate how various discursive practices may change 
according to relations between the actors (European citizens, EU institutions, 
Member States, human rights organizations, etc.)  
 
                                                          
3
 Definitions taken from Macmillan English Dictionary. 
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Since the start of its operational activities, FRONTEX has been constantly 
criticized by pro-migrant groups and human rights organizations for 
discriminatory treatment of undocumented immigrants and the violation of their 
fundamental rights. The agency has been accused of construction of the out-
group of immigrants which led to their rejection by the public opinion of the 
European citizens, According to R. Wodak, the division of people into 
antagonist groups is conceptualized by the researchers using various terms: 
difference, discrimination and even new racism [Wodak, 2008]. The mentioned 
concepts are supposed to underline that this tendency is defined not exclusively 
by the traditional terms of human races, but much more by hostility to 
immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers who are represented as the “others”, 
opposed to the EU citizens [Wodak, 2008:292]. Whatever terms one can use to 
describe the practice of dividing people into “ingroup” and “outgroup”, it is clear 
that this division creates the exclusionary approach and “isolates” immigrants, 
always leaving them “beyond” the borders of the European Union, both in 
physical and psychological senses (in the minds of the EU citizens who are 
addressed by numerous discourses, containing the mentioned exclusionary 
model) [Ibid]. According to the author, differences between various social 
groups take on a negative character not because the existence of differences 
that produces discrimination, but rather because of the generalization of such 
differences into negative categories and their attribution to whole groups, which 
constitutes stereotyping [Wodak, 2008:295].  
 
This dissertation will use the method suggested by Wodak in her analysis of 
exclusionary practices which lead to construction of discriminated out-groups. In 
this context, FRONTEX’ discourse analysis will be undertaken through the 
prism of five questions formulated by Ruth Wodak in order to examine 
theoretical and methodological approaches to the processes of social inclusion 
and exclusion, and the relevant discursive strategies which can potentially lead 
to “positive self-representation and negative other-representation” [Wodak, 
2008:302]. By “strategies” here is meant “more or less accurate and more or 
less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices), adopted to 
achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim” [Ibid].  
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The compilation of the questions formulated by the author and respective 
strategies can be represented in the following way: 
 
Question Strategy Objective Devices 
1. How are 
persons named 
and referred to 
linguistically? 
 
Reference/ 
nomination 
 
Construction of 
in-groups and 
out-groups 
Membership 
categorization: 
biological, 
naturalizing and 
depersonalizing 
metaphors 
2. What traits, 
characteristics, 
qualities and 
features are 
attributed to them? 
Predication Labeling social 
actors more or 
less positively 
or negatively, 
deprecatorily or 
appreciatively 
Stereotypical, 
evaluative 
attributions of 
negative or 
positive traits, 
implicit and 
explicit predicates 
3. By what 
arguments and 
argumentation 
schemes do 
specific persons or 
social groups try to 
justify and 
legitimize the 
inclusion/exclusion 
of others? 
Argumentation Justification of 
positive or 
negative 
attributions 
Arguments used 
to justify political 
inclusion or 
exclusion, 
discrimination or 
preferential 
treatment 
4. From what 
perspective or 
point of view are 
these labels, 
attributions and 
arguments 
expressed? 
Perspectivization, 
framing or 
discourse 
representation 
Expressing 
involvement 
positioning 
speaker’s point 
of view 
Reporting, 
description, 
narration or 
quotation of 
(discriminatory) 
events 
and utterances 
5. Are the 
respective 
utterances 
articulated overtly, 
are they intensified 
or are they 
mitigated? 
Intensification, 
mitigation 
Modifying the 
epistemic status 
of a proposition 
Intensifying or 
mitigating 
the illocutionary 
force or 
(discriminatory) 
utterances 
 
In what follows, the analysis will be undertaken in four main areas, adapting the 
model proposed by Wodak to the object of studies of this dissertation. The first 
part will examine two discursive models – the model of self-presentation of 
FRONTEX in its own discourse in the terms of effectiveness, cost-efficiency and 
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purely coordinating role of the agency, and “presupposition model” which is 
shaping the agency’s discourse with numerous assumptions and implications in 
the context of futures studies. The second part of the analysis will examine the 
way in which undocumented migrants are represented in FRONTEX’ discourse 
and will be oriented on the discursive strategies of reference/nomination and 
predication. The third part will be dedicated to the discursive strategy of 
argumentation and will mostly analyse FRONTEX’ securitizing practices 
regarding undocumented immigrants, which draw the direct link between “illegal 
migration” and internal security of the European Union. Finally, the fourth part of 
the analysis will join together the strategies of perspectivization and mitigation in 
order to demonstrate FRONTEX’ attempts to present its activities in the light of 
humanitarian practices and to mitigate harsh criticism of violations of 
fundamental rights of undocumented migrants during the agency’s operational 
activities.    
 
3.2 Data collection  
 
With the objective to undertake a deep and comprehensive analysis of 
FRONTEX’ discourse, the sources which have been chosen for the analysis 
can be divided into two large groups.  
 
The first one includes the agency’s documents and publications, which can 
potentially contribute to direct realization of epistemic power of FRONTEX by 
granting it the capacity to disseminate information that forms the basis of public 
opinion on whether the issue of irregular migration is a security concern. In view 
of a big volume of the available sources, several sub-groups of the sources 
were singled out in order to embrace their most multifarious and fullest scope.  
It is also necessary to specify, that the annual documents of the same domain 
(for example, annual risk analysis reports, activities reports and work programs) 
contain mostly the identical data from one year to another. Thus, the discourse 
analysis includes the following sources: 
1) FRONTEX’ Programme of Work 2013 and General Report 2012 as the basic 
documents which give the opportunity to examine the official point of view of the 
organization on the issues related with irregular migration; 
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2) FRONTEX’ Risk Analysis Report 2013 which can be estimated as a sort of 
the ideological concept of FRONTEX, as “risk analysis is the starting point for all 
FRONTEX activities, from joint operations through training to research studies” 
 [FRONTEX web-site]; 
3) FRONTEX’ press-releases published on its official website in the section 
“News” during the period from 13 October 2006 until 01 November 2013, which 
allow the analysis of the agency’s discourse made during almost eight years of 
the agency’s existence and give the general overview of FRONTEX’ discursive 
practices;  
4) interviews conducted with FRONTEX’ top-officials, which can be found in the 
media or are the elements of FRONTEX’ publications and present a rare 
example of deviation from highly standardized and monotonous rhetoric of 
FRONTEX’ documents; 
5)  FRONTEX Fundamental Rights Strategy which shows the agency’s reaction 
towards the outer critics for violation of human rights of undocumented 
immigrants.  
 
The second group of sources is linked with indirect epistemic power of 
FRONTEX which enables the organization to shape security understandings 
through its non-negligible role in training and consulting activities. As it stated 
on the FRONTEX website, through its “educational” activities the agency 
creates ‘multipliers’ who then return to their own national authorities and pass 
their training on to others. Here, the major restraint concerns the access to 
FRONTEX materials as the presentations and working papers distributed during 
the trainings and seminars are available only for the participants of these 
events. Therefore, the undertaken discourse analysis included the sources 
open to public access, i.e. the curricula of the events, the relevant press-
releases available on the official website and the programs of the mentioned 
events. There are also two FRONTEX’ research works analyzed here, Ethics of 
Border Security and Future of Borders, which were prepared within the 
framework of FRONTEX’ training activities as the organization is supposed to 
facilitate “information exchange between border management authorities, 
research institutes, universities and industry, via the organization of projects, 
workshops and conferences” [FRONTEX website].  
31 
 
 
To start with, it is worthy to give some general observations regarding common 
features which characterize all the agency’s documents and publications. First 
of all, it concerns the language used by the authors of these sources – all of 
them are written in a very reserved way with short, highly standardized phrases, 
as it will be seen in further analysis. Although this is a rather common manner 
for official documents of international organizations, it should be noticed that 
FRONTEX’ discourse is abundant with several clichés which will be described 
more minutely in what follows. The texts are also characterized by a minimal 
number of adjectives and metaphors which results in very monotonous 
expression of the ideas.  At the same time, it reinforces the contrast with rare 
cases when the phrases in FRONTEX’ discourse contains some uncommon for 
official rhetoric words (usually adjectives and adverbs), which are supposed to 
attract the readers’ attention. Normally, such rhetorical devices as hyperboles 
and euphemisms do not have their own knowledge content, but may emphasize 
or de-emphasize knowledge structures in discourse [Van Dijk, 2010:14], and 
this technique is successfully used by the authors of FRONTEX’ documents.  
 
3.3 Self-presentation model in FRONTEX’ discourse: effective, cost-
efficient and relieved of responsibility   
 
Before proceeding to more detailed analysis of FRONTEX’ discourse with the 
objective to reveal principal practices and techniques applied in the agency’s 
publications and documents, it would be reasonable first of all to examine in 
what way the agency is presented in its own discourse and from what positions 
it is interacting with its audience. To start with, it should be said that all the 
mentions of the agency are always made in “professional level management 
style language” [Horsti, 2012:307], which is supposed to demonstrate the high 
level of professionalism and efficiency of FRONTEX. One the agency’s reports 
– Beyond the Borders [FRONTEX, 2010a] – contains several chapters which 
describe various aspects of FRONTEX’ activities. The names of these chapters 
are given below and characterize, according to the authors of the report, 
FRONTEX’ main features, thus illustrating the image which is created by the 
agency for itself:  
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- Fast and efficient 
- The highest possible standard  
- Helping hand 
- Coming up with “smarter solutions” 
-  Flexible response  
- Expecting the unexpected  
 
The chosen terms would be probably more appropriate for the sphere of 
business and marketing than for the description of technical activities 
implemented by the EU agency. However, the authors of the documents are 
constantly using the adjectives and adverbs with superlative meaning (“perfectly 
timed”, “the most outstanding milestones and achievements”, “best practices 
and standards”, “efficient procedures”, “enhanced capabilities” etc.) to reinforce 
the impression about high potency of the agency’s work. This discursive 
technique is illustrated by several examples given below: 
 
The first joint operation in December of that year, though necessarily small in 
scale compared to later FRONTEX joint operations, was well-conceived and 
perfectly timed [FRONTEX, 2010a:7] 
 
Beyond the Frontiers highlights some of the most outstanding milestones 
and achievements of FRONTEX during its first five years [FRONTEX, 2010a:7] 
 
Passenger flow data (…) may help identify best practice and eventually ensure 
that checks are performed in a harmonised way [FRONTEX, 2013a:13] 
 
FRONTEX is very active in driving the process of harmonisation and 
development of best practices and standards in border control, both 
operational and technical, in line with existing and future EU measures 
[FRONTEX, 27 March 2013]  
 
Sharing of experience is also envisaged with a view to developing efficient 
border-control procedures, enhanced technical capabilities and exchange 
of best practices [FRONTEX, 16 April 2013]  
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It is also of high interest to observe how FRONTEX’ discourse avoids using any 
terms which can have negative connotation and give an unfavorable impression 
of its activities. The most obvious example here is the use of more neutral terms 
“effective return” or “repatriation” for operations of sending undocumented 
migrants back to their home countries. At the same time, the agency’s 
documents do not contain the term “deportation” in connexion with FRONTEX’ 
activities. The following extract illustrates the common way of speaking about 
this kind of operations:  
 
In 2012, there was a steady trend of about 160 000 third-country nationals 
effectively returned to third countries. Greece reported the largest number of 
returns of a single nationality (Albanians), and effective returns in Greece 
increased markedly in the last quarter of 2012 following the launch of the 
Xenios Zeus operation [FRONTEX, 2013a:6] 
 
Discursive practice of self-presentation can be conditionally divided into three 
sub-practices. The first one deals with the notions of efficiency and 
effectiveness and is supposed to demonstrate high results of FRONTEX’ 
activities. The interesting fact is that by suggesting the idea about its own 
potency, FRONTEX tries at the same time to partially relieve its responsibility in 
the sphere of decision-making and put it on the Member States. Thus, 
according to FRONTEX Deputy Executive Secretary  
G.A. Fernandez, the agency’s main contribution is providing “added value” to 
border management systems of the Member States: 
 
It must be stressed that FRONTEX does not replace the national border 
management systems of participating Member States: instead it 
complements and provides added value to those systems [FRONTEX, 
2010a:12] 
 
Another extract from the agency’s General Report (2012) illustrates the idea 
that FRONTEX is acting as a subsidiary body, but it is also thanks to its 
activities that “efficient and high level” of border control is achieved:  
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FRONTEX supports the Member States to achieve an efficient, high and 
uniform level of border control [FRONTEX, 2013b:7] 
 
Effectiveness of the agency’s activities is mentioned in various contexts. In the 
next passage, the matter concerns joint operational activities, the results of 
which are considered by the authors of the press release as “unprecedented”. 
The abstract also pays the reader’s attention to the securitized context of these 
activities as they must maintain the agency’s preparedness for “rapid response 
to emergency situations” at the external borders: 
 
Joint Operation RABIT 2010 was the first deployment of its type and its 
evaluation is crucial in maintaining FRONTEX’s preparedness for rapid 
response to emergency situations at the EU’s external borders. The scale 
and speed of the deployment — in terms of both human and technical 
resources — was unprecedented in the Agency’s history [FRONTEX, 27 
October 2011] 
 
The passage from another press release demonstrates how the agency 
stresses its “proactive” and “key role” in the domain of research on control and 
surveillance of the external borders: 
 
The Agency proactively monitors and contributes to developments in research 
relevant to the control and surveillance of the external borders. FRONTEX 
plays a key role in bridging the gap between producers and end users, making 
sure that the research and development community has a clear picture of the 
needs and challenges faced daily at the EU’s borders. The agency 
facilitates information exchange between border management authorities, 
research institutes, universities and industry, via the organisation of projects, 
workshops and conferences [FRONTEX, 27March 2013] 
 
The given above examples clearly illustrate that the discursive practice of 
effectiveness is overwhelmingly present in FRONTEX’ discourse. The level of 
this efficiency is evaluated within the agency so high that it has allowed I. 
Laitinen to call FRONTEX the “hostage of its own successes” (probably making 
an allusion to harsh criticism by human rights organisations and pro-migrant 
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groups) because of the undertaken “exceptional effort”. Here the attention 
should be paid to the precise addressee of the discourse – it appeals to the EU 
citizens (“people”) with the aim to demonstrate that the work of FRONTEX is 
effective and that the key issue of its competence, i.e. control of external 
borders of the EU, is successfully controlled:  
 
Someone has said that FRONTEX has become a hostage of its own 
successes. We surprised people in some ways, but that kind of exceptional 
effort has become expected. I would like to see that people understand how 
much the agency has been able to deliver [FRONTEX, 2010a:16]  
 
The sub-practice of efficiency includes also one more crucial for the agency 
component – cost-effectiveness of its activities. Taking into account that 
FRONTEX’ yearly budget fully depends on the decision of the Member States, it 
is extremely important to demonstrate in the discourse that allocated funds are 
spent in the best possible economical manner. Thus, for example, one of the 
agency’s main tasks – conducting risk analysis – is directly linked with the 
necessity to provide “effective balance and prioritizing the allocation of 
resources”. In order to emphasize the importance of proper financing of 
FRONTEX and to impel the Member States to allocate required resources, the 
report on risk analysis states that sufficient investments will have “ultimate 
effects on internal security of the EU”4:    
 
The Annual Risk Analysis 2013 is intended to facilitate and contribute to 
informed decisions on investments and concerted actions that are most likely 
to have sustainable effects on the management of the external borders and 
ultimately on the internal security of the EU. The ARA conclusions and 
identified risks at the EU’s external borders are meant to help effectively 
balance and prioritise the allocation of resources [FRONTEX, 2013a:8]  
 
The second sub-practice in the framework of self-presentation model of 
FRONTEX is connected with trustworthiness of the agency and, indirectly, of 
the contents of its discourse. The key premise here is that the audience is 
                                                          
4
 The discursive strategy of “internalization”  (presenting undocumented immigrants as a potential 
threat to internal security of the EU) will be analysed in one of the next chapters (see p. 58) 
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supposed to be convinced that the information provided in the agency’s 
discourse on illegal immigration is reliable and unbiased. This is especially 
important in the context of epistemic validity of the discourse (see p) – the 
agency can be empowered through the epistemes which it constitutes only in 
the case if the audience relies on its truthfulness. With this aim,  
the agency’s documents are abundant with the terms “trust”, “trustworthy” and 
their derivatives. Here is one of the examples of this self-presentation 
technique:  
 
FRONTEX is the trustworthy European Border Agency, strengthening the 
European area of Freedom, Security and Justice by supporting the Member 
States to keep up with their responsibilities [FRONTEX, 2013b:7] 
 
The openness for communications and high professionalism of FRONTEX staff 
members is also considered as one of the elements which must ensure the 
audience that FRONTEX’ activities assure effective control of the EU external 
borders, as it is demonstrated in the next abstract: 
 
Within a teamwork-focused framework, enabled by open communication, 
FRONTEX’s staff members share and live the corporate values. Consequently, 
they perform their activities in a highly professional way. Humanity links 
FRONTEX’s activities with the promotion and respect of Fundamental Rights as 
an unconditional and integral component of effective integrated border 
management resulting in trust in FRONTEX [FRONTEX, 2013b:7] 
 
Furthermore, according to I. Laitinen, FRONTEX deserves trust thanks to an 
extremely high level of experts involved into the agency’s activities. In the 
following passage the matter concerns the work of FRONTEX Consultative 
Forum on human rights: 
 
Nowhere in Europe can you find a higher or more professional level of 
expert knowledge (…) than in our Consultative Forum. Not only respect for 
Fundamental Rights, but their active promotion, is a firm cornerstone of the 
agency’s strategy and this forum reinforces that commitment [FRONTEX, 16 
October 2012] 
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Finally, the third sub-practice of FRONTEX’ self-presentation model lies in 
relieving any responsibility from the agency in the sphere of decision-making 
and control of the external borders by presenting it as a purely coordinating and 
de-politicized body. This discursive technique is used mostly in the interviews 
with FRONTEX’ officials who propagate the idea of coordination nature of the 
agency’s activities, as it illustrated in the next passage from the conversation 
with I. Laitinen: 
 
Generally, it must be noted that FRONTEX is never in lead of joint EU border 
control  operations, playing a mere coordinating role [Tondini, 2010] 
 
Moreover, another extract from Laitinen’s speech presents the agency as 
nothing but a subordinate to the will of the Member States body which “is not 
omnipotent” and “never will be a panacea to problems of illegal migration”: 
 
Responsibility for the control of the external borders lies with the Member 
States. It seems that the will of Member States is crystal clear. FRONTEX is 
not and never will be a panacea to problems of illegal migration. Summing 
up I would like to remind that FRONTEX activities are supplementary to 
those undertaken by the Member States. FRONTEX doesn’t have any 
monopole on border protection and is not omnipotent. It is a coordinator 
of the operational cooperation in which the Member States show their volition 
[FRONTEX, 11 June 2007] 
 
The effect achieved by the observed in this passage discursive technique in its 
combination with repetitive mentions of effective FRONTEX’ activities is dual – 
on the one hand, responsibility for any incidents during operational activities is 
put on the EU members as FRONTEX is excluded by its own discourse from 
any decision-making in this process, being dependent on the “volition of the 
Member States”. On the other hand, all successes in operational activities, 
research work and other domains are attributed to FRONTEX and are 
presented as “unprecedented in the Agency’s history”. Therefore, the authors of 
FRONTEX’ documents endow themselves with the right to decide when the 
achievements and positive events are regarded as a merit of the agency and 
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when occurrences with negative connotation are imputed to the Member States. 
This discursive technique is reproduced also in other contexts – in the next 
passage, FRONTEX Operations Division Director K. Roesler is speaking about 
infringements of personal data:  
 
FRONTEX is not the ‘owner’ of such data, and for the time being we don’t 
process any personal data. All the information goes to the host nation (…) so 
we can’t cross-check names or telephone numbers for them, for example. We 
are just coordinating the operations by providing expertise and support, 
and it is the responsibility of the host member state’s security agencies to 
share it with the relevant EU and international agencies. From there they can 
work on dismantling the criminal networks, through sharing the data they 
accumulate through the operations coordinated by us [Deliso, 2011] 
  
Thus, the discourse stresses once again the “coordinating, expertise and 
support” role of FRONTEX and relieves any responsibility from the agency in 
case of leakage of data. Another example of this practice can be observed in I. 
Laitinen’s comment on respect of fundamental rights of undocumented migrants 
– according to the following extract, FRONTEX does not carry any responsibility 
for detention of immigrants as it is an “exclusive remit” of the Member States: 
 
We would like to recall that FRONTEX fully respects and strives for promoting 
Fundamental Rights in its border control operations which, however, do not 
include organisation of, and responsibility for, detention on the territory of 
the Member States, which remains their exclusive remit [FRONTEX, 21 
September 2011] 
 
Self-presentation model in FRONTEX’ discourse allows therefore shaping 
several key ideas for perception of the agency’s activities by the audience. 
FRONTEX is described as an effective, highly professional and trustworthy 
actor which manages to engage the best experts and specialists for work under 
its auspices. At the same time, the discourse excludes any direct responsibility 
of the agency for detention and violation of fundamental rights of immigrants, 
control of the external borders of the EU, protection of personal data and other 
aspects which can provoke negative for the agency connotations. By doing this 
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the discourse diverts attention from any controversial activities of the agency 
and emphasizes only its achievements and effectiveness.   
 
3.4 Presupposition model in FRONTEX’ discourse: creating the future 
 
The conception of epistemic power presumes, in particular, shaping of certain 
understandings and ideas in the minds of the audience of the discourse and 
creating fixed meanings of certain issues. In this context, one of the discursive 
practices of FRONTEX presents a particular interest as it deals with predicting 
the future situations related with immigration and control of the EU external 
borders. In December 2011 FRONTEX published a report entitled “Futures of 
Borders: A Forward Study of European Border Checks” elaborated by the 
agency’s Research and Development Unit” [FRONTEX, 2011b]. The authors of 
this paper have chosen as its slogan the expression of the American 
management consultant Peter Drucker – “The best way to predict the future 
– is to create it” [FRONTEX, 2011b, Executive Summary:5]. This is how 
FRONTEX’ experts explain the key idea of the report:  
 
We suggest that policy makers and border guard practitioners alike take an 
active approach towards the future. What may transform one future scenario 
into another are often relatively small acts performed by people at intervention 
points as early as possible. This is true for everything from strategic, long 
term policy decisions to tactical behaviour at border crossings [FRONTEX, 
2011b, Executive Summary:5] 
 
The report, which is “focused on the futures and foresight tools that may be 
relevant for European border control” [FRONTEX, 2011b:3], emphasizes the 
importance of prediction of future trends for policy decisions and planning. This 
discursive practice has a direct connexion with the agency’s epistemic power as 
it allows FRONTEX to shape the understandings and formulate certain 
problems and the ways of their solution among various EU decision makers, in 
particular through the undertaken by the agency risk analysis. This is how the 
mentioned idea is illustrated in the report: 
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Attempting to make future estimates, both near- and long-term is a useful 
exercise, in that it inculcates futures thinking among decision makers and 
planners [FRONTEX, 2011b, Executive Summary:5] 
 
This discursive model reflects the adherence of the authors of FRONTEX’ 
research papers to the interdisciplinary field of futures studies which considers 
“shaping” or “forging” the future as the scientific attempt to “prepare for the 
future and to deal with (…) uncertainties” that arise in the social and political 
world [Dunmire, 2011:4]. In this context, the creation of expectations should be 
seen as a rhetorical act through which the actors can make “rhetorical 
evocations of a remote time” which, in turn, have material effects on the present 
by legitimating more immediate proposals and policies that serve the partisan’s 
political goals and interests [Edelman, 1988:18]. By projecting particular images 
of the future, the actors are able to influence people’s interpretation and 
perception of “ambiguous current facts” in ways that typically serve the actor’s 
goals [Edelman, 1988:8]. FRONTEX’ discourse on illegal migration completely 
avails itself with this practice by integrating prognosis of future situations into 
the agency’s documents and publications. The following paragraph from the 
report highlights the importance of future studies as a “tool” which helps to turn 
expressed ideas into concrete political decisions of policy makers: 
 
The recent turmoil in global events has again highlighted the significance of 
futures studies for both governments and policy makers. Futures studies 
should be thought of as tools which aid thinking about possible futures, in 
order to recognise trends while acknowledging the likelihood of (even radical) 
change [FRONTEX, 2011b:3] 
 
The report contains four future scenarios types elaborated by FRONTEX’ 
experts and actively used in the agency’s discourse on illegal immigration:  
 
1) Probable futures, which envisage direct or probable continuation of existing 
current trends, such as population or economic growth. The extrapolation of 
these trends can be derived using quantitative/statistical methodologies and 
specific futures methods such as partial data extrapolation. Forecasts are then 
41 
 
made about what is most likely, although not necessarily, to happen 
[FRONTEX, 2011b:59]; 
 
2) Alternative (possible) futures, which are feasible in the framework of existing 
data, trends and emerging patterns, although they may not be the most 
common extrapolated outcome. While not fully predictive, alternative futures 
help identify critical uncertainties that have substantive probability [FRONTEX, 
2011b:59]; 
 
3. Plausible-preferred futures, which present the fusion of desires, hopes and 
aspirations for a “better world”. While such scenarios may sometimes seem 
utopian and at times unrealistic, they act as an invaluable policy tool, marking a 
vision of goals to aspire and plan for while underlining the difficulty of reaching 
them [FRONTEX, 2011b:60]; 
 
4. “Wild-Cards” scenarios   
In defining ‘Wild-Card’ scenarios, the main characteristic is the unpredictability 
of events that have a low probability but potentially enormous impact. It is 
important to be aware of possible ‘Wild-Card’ scenarios as early as possible in 
order to prepare strategically for the unlikely, yet potentially acute, 
repercussions which would otherwise be ignored due to their very small 
probability. The methodological bases for Wild Card scenarios include a 
multitude of creative methodologies aimed at identifying extreme scenarios, 
risks, trends or patterns falling outside the realm of ‘conventional wisdom’ 
[FRONTEX, 2011b:60]. 
 
The next extract illustrates how the authors of the report define the role of future 
scenarios: 
 
Scenarios make no prediction about how things will develop, but show the 
extent of how things might turn out and thus are useful for planning 
strategies – forcing the explicit statement and revision of assumptions 
[FRONTEX, 2011b:4] 
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What is not mentioned in this passage is that besides “being useful for planning 
strategies”, future scenarios are also transformed into various discursive 
techniques and implicitly contribute to shaping the ideas among the audience of 
FRONTEX’ discourse. In this dissertation, the mentioned model of 
argumentation is called presupposition model as it contains various implications 
and assumptions for future. This practice envisages the sharing of presupposed 
knowledge even if it is not asserted and sometimes even not expressed but left 
implicit as parts of mental models; this means that knowledge may be also 
obliquely asserted as if it were generally known and shared [Van Dijk, 2009:13].  
 
Presupposition model in FRONTEX’ discourse is usually characterized by 
generalizing assumptions which are supposed to convince the reader that the 
provided information is reliable and doubtless even if it is not confirmed by any 
proves. In the next example it is clearly seen how the authors of the Risk 
Analysis Report reinforce the idea of the possible “shift” of the regular migrants 
to irregular ones without any confirmation of this “generally believed” 
implication: 
 
There are no data available on the rate of people who arrive on short-term 
visas but do no depart before their visa expires (overstaying). Indeed, it is 
generally believed that overstaying is a very common modus operandi for 
irregular migration to the EU [FRONTEX, 2013a:18] 
 
At the same time, FRONTEX’ discourse contains the elements that directly 
contradict to such assumptions because they admit that the available statistical 
tools and “current state of knowledge” do not let make any reliable prognosis, 
as it is shown in the next passages in the context of “migratory flows”: 
 
Even the large regular flows composed mainly of EU citizens cannot be 
predicted with any great accuracy with current tools and data. Illegal (…) 
flows are even more difficult to estimate let alone predict, given the current 
state of knowledge and practices in collecting statistics [FRONTEX, 2011b, 
Executive Summary:2] 
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Although we don’t know how the migratory flows and risks will develop, 
but we are prepared to assist the Member States whose external borders will be 
affected [Deliso,2011] 
 
Furthermore, even in the case of trustworthy statistical information, the report 
directly indicates the fact that there is always a risk of intervention of unforeseen 
factors (wild cards) which can totally distort the prognosis. That is why the 
following abstract urges to consider any predictions only as “rough indications” 
under the condition that “all other factors remain equal” (which is practically 
impossible in the reality): 
 
While some numerical estimates based on current trends can be made in 
regard to regular flows, intervening factors and ‘wild can quickly change such 
estimates and render them meaningless. This was clearly demonstrated (…) 
when first the volcanic eruption in Iceland and then the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings 
had major effects on the numbers of regular and irregular crossings of the 
external borders of the EU. Predictions of trends, therefore, should always 
be read with caution and taken as rough indications of future 
developments only if all other factors remain equal. This lack of accuracy 
has clear implications for planning border controls in the future: planning cannot 
be based on specific predictions of trends or ‘likely’ developments. With 
current knowledge, the future will always be unpredictable [FRONTEX, 
2011b, Executive Summary:3] 
 
The last phrase of the given above abstract completely depreciates the 
presupposition model of FRONTEX’ discourse - the thesis about impossibility of 
predicting the future with available to the agency information is quite evident. 
However, that does not restrain FRONTEX’ officials to reproduce the idea of 
ever-increasing flow of immigrants as it can be observed in the interview of 
Head of the Research and Development Unit E. Beugels: 
 
We always have to keep in mind the fact that the number of people who 
cross the border is not going to diminish. It is only going to increase. So in 
order to deal with ever-increasing numbers of travellers, we have to come up 
with the smarter solutions [FRONTEX, 2010a:57] 
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In general, presupposition model is characterized by appealing to the notion of 
likelihood and the use of the rhetorical construction “to be likely to”, as it is 
demonstrated in the next passages:  
 
The difficulties in estimating real numbers of current flows make prediction of 
future flows nearly impossible. That said, current trends (particularly in North 
Africa) suggest that long-term irregular mobility is likely to increase in the short- 
to medium-term [FRONTEX, 2011b, Executive Summary:2]  
 
Crisis situations are still likely to arise at the southern border with thousands of 
people trying to cross the border illegally in the span of several weeks or 
months. Past experiences also show that these crises take their toll on human 
lives, and are very difficult to predict and quell without a coordinated 
response [FRONTEX, 2013a:7] 
 
In some documents, one can find even more evident assumptions which are not 
based on the proved information but which are however used to suggest the 
same idea of risks coming from migration issues. In the following extract from 
FRONTEX’ press release, the presupposition is made regarding the possible 
growth of the number of irregular migrants in the EU and then this assumption is 
linked with visa-liberalization procedures, creating a negative context for this 
process, which is normally considered to be favorable for fostering traveling of 
the foreigners: 
 
Over the coming year, irregular passenger flows across the external borders 
are expected to increase. This is due to increasing mobility globally as well 
as the possibility of visa-liberalisation procedures for the EU’s eastern 
European partners and new agreements governing local border traffic along the 
eastern borders [FRONTEX, 11 May 2011] 
 
Indeed, FRONTEX discourse repeatedly averts to the topic of visa procedures 
paying particular attention to any possible abuse of the legal requirements. This 
mechanism of presentation of legitimate travelers as the potential fraudsters 
results in creating the negative image of any immigrants in the minds of the 
audience of the discourse. Thus, the following passage concerns the students 
45 
 
who are considered by the authors of the agency’s report in the context of 
abuse of student visas. In what follows, one more example of using the 
presupposition model is observed: without any precise data on the discussed 
subject, the discourse is implicitly praising the measures aimed at toughening of 
visa requirements in order to “tackle abuse” and is putting softening of these 
procedures “in the contrast” with the need to take further protecting measures.  
 
Overall, at EU level, the extent of the abuse of student visa is unknown. 
Gauging from the responses by Member States, the phenomenon seem to vary 
widely among Member States. The UK made changes to Tier 4 (student tier) of 
their Points-Based System to tackle abuse, including by increasing the level of 
English language proficiency and imposing additional requirements on 
educational institutions. In contrast, twelve Member States took steps in 
simplifying procedures for students to enter and stay on their territory as this is 
seen as a way to import skilled and educated foreigners [FRONTEX, 2013a:43] 
 
In fact, all the analysed sources consider visa-issuing procedures in the context 
of fighting with undocumented migration without any references to the 
primordial assignment of this process – facilitating legitimate traveling of the 
foreigners within the EU.  The example of this approach if given below: 
 
Member States have introduced a variety of specific measures in their visa-
issuing procedures to tackle irregular migration, which includes the 
assessment of willingness to return, the training of personnel at embassies and 
consulates, and cooperation and information exchange with other entities and 
Member States. Other preventive measures include the use of biometric data 
in the visa application process, as well as the identification of specific categories 
of migrants who might misuse their visa and awareness raising in third 
countries of the consequences of making fraudulent applications [FRONTEX, 
2013a:13] 
 
In the public discourse, FRONTEX’ experts draw a clear parallel between one of 
the main agency’s activities – risk analysis – and future studies by considering 
the latter as “useful methods for analysing future risk” which can be later 
transformed into policy decisions (“implementing various policy options): 
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Futures methods can and should be directly connected to risk analysis by 
border guard units and management. While futures studies contribute some 
specific useful methods for analysing future risk, when entwined into risk 
analysis units’ work it also supports a forward look through scenarios into 
futures implications of implementing various policy options [FRONTEX, 
2011b:94] 
 
In this context, the following passage from FRONTEX Spokesperson Mikal 
Parzysek’ interview presents particular interest as the agency’s official is using 
a very well-aimed metaphor demonstrating the highest level of uncertainty 
about the provided information but however emphasizing the capacity of 
professional FRONTEX’ experts to predict the future:  
 
This is a bit like looking into a crystal ball but of course our risk analysis 
experts always view each expansion of the Schengen Area as a risk [Dikov, 
2011] 
 
To sum up, presupposition model is one of the essential FRONTEX’ discursive 
practices as it creates the basis for numerous assumptions and implications 
which are intended to fix the vision of future situation in the way which, on the 
one hand, demonstrates the professional level of the agency’s expertise, and on 
the other hand, convinces the audience of the discourse in high probability of 
the scenarios elaborated within the agency. Even if FRONTEX’ researchers 
admit the fact that it is practically impossible to predict the future, they are 
literally “creating” it on the basis of presuppositions made in the public 
discourse.   
 
3.5 Discursive strategy of nomination/predication: construction of the out-
group of undocumented immigrants 
 
One of the essential discursive strategies, which is specifically affected by the 
management of knowledge and, thus, is traditionally examined within the 
framework of critical discourse analysis, is actor description (or nomination, 
using the terminology of R. Wodak). According to T. Van Dijk, most discourse 
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and much knowledge is about people, and it is therefore crucial how people are 
being described by the authors of  the discourse and in what identities, roles 
and relationships they are represented. The most important point here is that 
the way of representing people can become the “locus of the ideological 
polarization between in-group (Us) and out-group (Them)” [Van Dijk, 2010:13]. 
In this context, FRONTEX’ discourse can serve as a clear example of 
exclusionary practice towards immigrants. In what follows, the analysis of the 
agency’s documents and publications will allow to observe in what way the 
immigrants are labeled and described and to see how this representation is 
leading to creating the exclusionary vision of this group of people.  
 
From the syntactic point of view, it is important to analyse whether the actor’s 
description is made in active or passive voice in order to see if the actor is 
described as a responsible agent, target or victim of action: groups of people 
subject to exclusionary practices are often represented in a passive role, unless 
they are the agents of actions which are considered in the discourse as 
negative ones [Van Dijk, 2010: 40]. This strategy provides an opportunity to 
show that the excluded minority is responsible for some objectionable activities 
(which is emphasized by using the active voice) and, therefore, some measures 
should be undertaken against them (underlined by application of the passive 
voice). This practice is fully encompassed in FRONTEX’ discourse and can be 
observed, for example, in the following passages:  
 
Many migrants who cross the border illegally to Greece move on to other 
Member States, mostly through the land route across the Western Balkans 
[FRONTEX, 2013a:5] 
 
Many of the migrants who crossed illegally through the Eastern 
Mediterranean route are expected to continue making secondary movements 
across the Western Balkans and within the EU [FRONTEX, 2013a:6] 
 
Turkey is also used as a point of embarkation for attempts to enter the EU 
illegally by air. Migrants take advantage of low airfares and arrive at the 
Turkish airport of Istanbul by plane [FRONTEX, 2012a:8]  
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Starting from 2008, considerable numbers of migrants had been detected 
crossing illegally the border between Turkey and Greece [FRONTEX, 2013a:5] 
 
Indeed, the sentences in which the migrants are defined as the subjects 
committing an action (“cross”, “move on”, “take advantage”, “arrive”) have a 
direct connotation with illegitimate character of their activity and, thus, 
emphasize their responsibility. At the same time, representing migrants as the 
target of FRONTEX’ operations (“had been detected”) and forecasting of their 
further actions (“are expected”) demonstrate the need of some reaction towards 
this excluded group of people in order to prevent their entry to the European 
Union. 
 
 3.5.1 Terminological debates: illegal/irregular/undocumented  
 
Generally, it is quite remarkable that FRONTEX’ discourse is characterized by 
the absence of practically any adjectives and adverbs which are used together 
with the noun “migrants”. In fact, this nomination method creates a strong 
categorization by forming an out-group that is practically depraved of any 
characteristics or metaphors. There are only two exceptions which can be 
pointed out in this regard in FRONTEX’ documents. The first one is connected 
with the controversial question of using the adjectives “irregular” and “illegal” 
and all their derivatives. The problem of arbitrary choice of proper terminology 
regarding migration processes and immigrants has been discussed during 
many years in academic and expert circles. The terminology adopted by 
migration researchers, governments and journalists differs substantially and is 
rarely based on a substantive conceptual justification of the selection of one 
term over another [Paspalanova, 2008:80]. The meaning of the term “illegal” 
has a clearly negative side, because the exclusionary notion of “illegality” of 
migrants is simultaneously perceived by the audience of the discourse at three 
levels: as a form of juridical status of migrants, as their social condition and, 
finally, even as a mode of being-in-the-world [Willen, 2007:4]. In this connection, 
in the UN Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, it is 
advised to call the "...foreigners who violate the rules of admission of the 
receiving country and are deportable, as well as foreign persons attempting to 
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seek asylum but who are not allowed to file an application and are not permitted 
to stay in the receiving country on any other grounds" as "citizens departing 
without the admission documents required by the country of destination" or 
"foreigners whose entry or stay is not sanctioned" [UN, 1998:23]. Thus, the 
essential criterion here is the presence or absence of the documents autorising 
the entry in a country. This idea is supported in the report of the UN Global 
Commission on International Migration, which asserts that a person cannot be 
“illegal” and recommends to use the term “migrants with irregular status” 
[Morehouse and Blomfield, 2011:4]. However, there is still no fixed approach to 
this issue and, thus, both definitions are being used throughout the world. At the 
same time, the United Nations, non-governmental  organizations, and migrant 
groups in Europe often use the term “undocumented migration” and 
“undocumented immigrants” in order to soften the negative connotations of 
other terms (illegal and irregular) [Ibid]. With the same objective, this 
dissertation is also applying the term “undocumented” in all cases except 
citations from FRONTEX’ documents and publications and the expression 
“discourse on illegal immigration” which is supposed to demonstrate the 
negative context created by the agency by choosing this terminological 
definition.  
 
FRONTEX’ discourse provides an utterly interesting example of the application 
of the terms “irregular” and “illegal”. It is noteworthy to mention that the term 
“illegal” is practically not used in the recent documents of the agency even if 
sometimes FRONTEX officials still apply this definition towards the migrants as 
it is demonstrated in the following passage: 
 
The flow of illegal migrants in Northeastern Greece is rather constant – it varies 
from 70 to 100 persons a day [Dikov, 2011] 
 
Nevertheless, the authors of FRONTEX’ documents mostly use the more 
neutral term “irregular” in combination with such nouns as “migrants”, 
“migration”, “immigration” and “migration flows”. However, a rather curious detail 
is that the term “illegal” is widely used throughout the agency’s documents 
together with such words as “border-crossing”, “stay”, “activities”, “stayers” and 
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“entries” (sometimes being also replaced by the word “clandestine”), for 
example: 
 
At the same time, illegal border crossing, clandestine entry and refusals of 
entry all increased significantly against a year earlier, as did the number of 
asylum applications received by Member States [FRONTEX, 4 October 2011]  
 
The quantitative analysis of one of the most recent FRONTEX’ documents – 
Risk Analysis Report 2013 – shows that the proportion between the mentioned 
terms is as follows: the term “irregular” is used 49 times while the definition 
“illegal” is given 143 times. Therefore, even if the authors of the agency’s 
documents try to avoid the application of the phrase “illegal migrants” following 
the most commonly accepted tendency, the excessive use of this adjective in 
the connotation with the acts committed by these migrants (entry/cross/stay 
etc.) creates in the minds of the audience the representation of the threat to the 
European Community and at the same time constructs the out-group, which 
was called by R. Wodak the “bad others” [Wodak 2008:304]. This evaluative 
attribution of illegal character of the migrants’ activities is only one of several 
rhetorical devises aimed at creating the image of insecurity and danger and 
thus can be considered as a securitizing practice, the whole specter of which 
will be analysed more profoundly in the next part of the analysis of FRONTEX’ 
discourse.  
 
3.5.2 Presenting undocumented migration in the EU as the mass 
phenomenon 
 
The second case, when the noun “migrants” is accompanied by any metaphors, 
is the representation of migration to the EU as the mass phenomenon by 
consequent use of quantitative adverbs and nouns. Numerous examples of this 
discursive strategy create the impression of the important number of 
undocumented immigrants who are trying to enter the EU: to achieve this 
objective, the authors use the phrases like “considerable/large/big number of 
migrants”, “many migrants”, “majority of migrants”, “most migrants”, etc. 
Furthermore, with the help of the figure of speech pars pro toto (when the whole 
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is referred to by mentioning only one if its parts), these rhetorical devises 
contribute to generalizing all the migrants by attributing to them some negative 
trends without giving any precise information about their number:    
 
However, there is currently no estimate of the annual flow of irregular 
migrants crossing the border illegally [FRONTEX, 2013a:7] 
 
Greece is a Schengen exclave and a transit rather than destination country for 
the majority of migrants [FRONTEX, 2013a:27] 
 
Worth mentioning is also the fact that many more migrants opted for 
clandestine entry (hiding in lorries or trains) during 2012 compared to 2011 
[FRONTEX, 2013a:27] 
 
Increasing numbers of other migrants, usually from Asia, claim to have been 
living in Greece for a number of years before deciding to leave for other 
Member States because of the economic crisis [FRONTEX, 2013a:28] 
 
The thesis about mass character of undocumented migration is also 
emphasized by using such words as “flow”, “influx”, “wave” and “tide” 
(reinforced even more by the hyperbolic devises as “overrepresented”, “heavy” 
and “dramatic effect”). The association with rising water may potentially create a 
connotation with some natural disasters that should be prevented in order to 
avoid the damage. The following citations illustrate the use if this discursive 
practice: 
 
Of the official 2011 figures, by far the biggest influx was noted in Lampedusa, 
where 5031 migrants were recorded between January 1 and February 13, in 
80 arrivals [FRONTEX, 15 February 2011] 
 
Migrants living in or having relatively easy/facilitated access to Turkey and/or 
North Africa will continue to be overrepresented in the flow of irregular 
migrants to the EU [FRONTEX, 2013a:61] 
 
On the Central Mediterranean sea route to the EU, 2011 was marked by heavy 
influxes from Libya and Tunisia as a result of the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings. 
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Meanwhile, on the Eastern Mediterranean route, migrant flows through the 
previous hot-spot of the Greek-Turkish land border were largely stemmed by 
increased efforts by the Greek authorities. The effects of the Aspida, or ‘Shield,’ 
operation by Greece had a dramatic effect on inflows [FRONTEX, 18 April 
2013] 
 
The mentioned above thesis is also accentuated by other rhetorical devises 
which are constantly reinforcing the image of increasing number of migrants 
(not only undocumented ones), who in their turn create what the authors of 
FRONTEX’ documents call “migratory pressure”, as illustrated in the following 
quotes: 
 
Civil unrest erupting in Tunisia and Libya in 2011 saw a massive spike in the 
number of migrants using this route [FRONTEX, 4 October 2013] 
 
By far the most dramatic change of 2010 occurred at the Greek borders with 
Turkey (land and sea), which recorded a 45% increase between 2009 and 
2010. The Greek-Turkish land border in particular saw massive increases in 
migratory pressure, peaking at around 350 irregular migrants a day 
predominantly crossing a 12.5-km section of land border in the Evros river 
region, mainly around the Greek city of Orestiada [FRONTEX, 11 may 2011] 
 
It is noteworthy that the migratory pressure over the summer months of 2013 
was comparable to the same period in 2011 [FRONTEX, 4 October 2013] 
 
Particular attention should be paid to the verb with a very strong and even 
radical meaning which is often used in FRONTEX’ discourse regarding the 
phenomenon of undocumented migration – “to stem” – which is defined in 
Macmillan Dictionary in the following way: to stop something from spreading or 
increasing, especially something bad [Macmillan English Dictionary Online]. It is 
interesting to observe that different thesauruses give the examples of using this 
verb in the following connotations: to stem the flood, to stem the tide, to stem 
the rise of crime, etc. Therefore, this verb is applied always in the negative 
context towards something that should be eradicated. Here is another example 
of using this rhetorical devise in FRONTEX’ discourse:  
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We could effectively launch capacity building programmes in third countries, 
aimed at creating the conditions to help in stemming irregular migration 
flows towards Europe [Tondini, 2010] 
 
Sometimes, the mentioned expressions are used several times in the same 
sentence to reinforce the idea of the mass character of immigration: 
 
Since the end of the reporting period (March 2011) the flow of Tunisians has 
reduced significantly, in part due to an accelerated repatriation agreement 
between the Italian and Tunisian governments in April though the flow was 
followed by a subsequent influx from Libya of primarily sub-Saharan migrants 
following civil unrest and NATO Operation Unified Protector in Libya 
[FRONTEX, 21 July 2011] 
 
When a reader is permanently coming across the hyperbolic words like “flow”, 
“influx” or “wave” in the immigration context, it is quite natural that as a result of 
this discursive practice he makes a conclusion about a really big number of 
undocumented migrants. Indeed, it is a logical passage from the image created 
in the reader’s mind by the mentioned above hyperboles towards the numerical 
expression of immigrants. Thus, we observe the substitution of precise numbers 
by rhetorical devises, while the real number of undocumented migrants is 
sequentially omitted in FRONTEX’ discourse. But if the reader goes further to 
find some concrete data, the truth is that this figure makes up only 0.1% of the 
whole number of all the travelers coming to the EU [FRONTEX, 2011b:31]. At 
the same time, even if FRONTEX’ discourse contains some paragraphs 
regarding information on the number of undocumented migrants, these 
statements are made on the basis of the already mentioned presupposition 
model and are characterized by the high level of assumption and uncertainty. 
For example, in the following extract we can observe that without any proof of 
the increasing number of migrants (“might be”), the authors of the discourse use 
this argument as one of the two possible reasons of the amount of the number 
of detections of illegal border-crossing. The second potential reason 
(improvement of detection technique of border officers) is put only in the second 
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place, even if its probability, expressed by the modal verb “may”, is stronger 
than in the first case. 
 
The number of detections of illegal border-crossing and refusals of entry are 
both functions of the amount of effort spent detecting migrants and the actual 
flow of irregular migrants to the EU. For example, increased detections of illegal 
border-crossing might be due to a real increase in the flow of irregular 
migrants, or may in fact be an outcome of more resources made available 
to detect migrants [FRONTEX, 2013a:10] 
 
Another extract shows a manipulation with the numbers of undocumented 
immigrants, when the authors of the report define the lowest possible figure as 
a “conservative” one (notwithstanding already the fact that the proposed 
variation doubles its meaning) and then give another possible figure, which is 
much higher than the first one, without any reference to the source of 
information:  
 
Conservative estimates of the number of irregular migrants within the EU vary 
between three and six million, according to the results of Clandestino, an EU-
sponsored project implemented by the ICMPD. Other estimates put the figure 
of irregular migrants at eight million, of which 80% are staying inside the 
Schengen area, half of them having originally entered it legally [FRONTEX, 
2013a:10] 
 
Furthermore, sometimes the authors of the agency’s documents demonstrate 
pretensions of the absolute infallibility of their opinion with complete disregard to 
absence of official data, like in the following paragraph on the number of 
overstaying the granted visas: 
 
No one really has numbers how many people are overstaying their visas but 
their numbers are certainly much higher than the number of illegal immigrants 
detected at sea or land borders [Dikov, 2011] 
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Remarkably, sometimes the blame for the impossibility to have precise data is 
implicitly placed on the migrants, because of “clandestine nature” of their  
irregular mobility:  
 
Unfortunately, due to the clandestine nature of such causes of temporary 
irregular mobility and sometimes the political sensitivities associated with them, 
detailed and accurate statistics and data are difficult to obtain [FRONTEX, 
2011b:32]  
 
The preceding analysis has shown three main discursive “exclusionary” 
mechanisms of construction of the out-group of undocumented immigrants: 
variations in use of active and passive voice which can either define the 
immigrants as the subjects of negatively represented actions or, vice versa, 
demonstrate the necessity of undertaking some reciprocal measures; 
manipulation with terminological controversy between the notions “irregular” and 
“illegal”, which creates the link between the migrants and illegitimate actions 
with the potential security threat; finally, representation of undocumented 
migration as the mass phenomenon, which is not actually confirmed by precise 
numerical information. This way of nomination and predication of 
undocumented migrants is even emphasized by the implicit idea of the risk of 
“invasion” of the immigrants who are represented in FRONTEX’ discourse as 
the multitude of people concentrated at the external borders and waiting only for 
some interruption or loosening of border control activities in order to penetrate 
on the territory of the European Union: 
 
There remains the risk of resurgence of irregular migration, since many 
migrants may be waiting for the conclusion of the Greek operations before 
they continue their journey towards Europe [FRONTEX, 2013a:5] 
 
Moreover, the authors of FRONTEX’ documents have elaborated the 
“borderline” between the out-group of undocumented migrants and the in-group 
of the EU citizens: the principal idea here is to construct the contraposition 
between prosperous and wealthy European Union which is depicted as a 
cherished target for the migrants from poor miserable countries:  
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Given the rather limited shift in detections of migrants crossing illegally from 
Turkey, it is also likely that a substantial proportion of migrants failing or not 
trying to enter the EU prefer to stay in Turkey, rather than returning to their 
more unstable and substantially poorer home countries [FRONTEX, 
2013a:24] 
 
Tens of thousands of citizens from countries such as Senegal, Mauritania 
and Cape Verde, attracted by the prospect of life in Europe and lured by the 
relative proximity of the Canary Islands, had decided to risk a hazardous sea 
voyage in ill-equipped open boats known as Cayucos [FRONTEX, 2010a:31] 
 
It is also important to mention the collective pronoun “we all”, used in the 
discussed extract. Moreover, the public speeches and interviews of I. Laitinen 
are often characterized by the idea of unification of all the European countries 
and citizens in the context of counteraction against undocumented migration. 
This technique contributes in shifting of border drawing and constructing the in-
group of European citizens on the one side of the border and the out-group of 
foreigners (potential immigrants) on the other side. In the following paragraph 
he is expressing his opinion about “European-wide” common approaches and 
ideas, which are crucial for dealing with the immigrants, and is reproaching the 
Member States for having their own, “nationally oriented” strategies on this 
issue:   
 
We have to think European-wide. In some areas of border control we have 
made certain steps, we have a system of European oriented operations. But 
in other ways we still have very nationally oriented approaches to things, 
such as deciding eligibility for asylum. As long as this fundamental question of 
immigration is not European-wide, we will continue to have to deal with it. We 
have had to postpone or even cancel some maritime operations because there 
was no solution about what to do with people who have been picked up or 
rescued. So I see no choice but to have a common policy. However, it is quite a 
challenge for citizens to start thinking in a more European way. It will take 
a long time. It really is a challenge [FRONTEX, 2010a:14] 
 
By calling the EU citizens to think in a “more European way” and representing 
this need as a challenge, Laitinen favours the existence of the in-group which is 
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opposed by some sort of danger from outside and, therefore, needs to unite in 
order to resist to this threat. This idea is backed up by another FRONTEX’ high 
official – Deputy Executive Director G.A. Fernandes – who is even more rigid in 
his evaluations of undocumented migration. In the following citation we observe 
once more the construction of the in-group of European citizens (“challenges for 
us”), who are threatened by the danger “from the outside”: 
 
There are still challenges for us in the future, but all of them are from the 
outside, from the external environment. And FRONTEX is ready to meet 
them [FRONTEX, 2010a:75] 
 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter has demonstrated how the discursive 
strategy of nomination in FRONTEX discourse promotes the construction of the 
excluded out-group of undocumented immigrants who are labeled by the 
features that draw the connection with the potential risk and danger to the 
security of the European Union. The next step now is to examine by what 
argumentation schemes the authors of the agency’s documents try to prove that 
the exclusion of undocumented immigrants is justified. The subsequent 
discourse analysis will show the rhetorical devises which can be considered as 
securutizing practices aiming to create the image of security threat caused by 
undocumented immigrants.  
 
3.6 Discursive strategy of argumentation: creating security issues 
 
The analysis of the rhetorical devises used in FRONTEX’ publications as 
argumentation schemes of exclusion of the “out-group” of undocumented 
immigrants gives an opportunity to see the way in which these discursive 
techniques allow the agency to “induce or increase the public mind’s adherence 
to the thesis presented to its assent” [Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecka, 1969:4]. 
Indeed, after having drawn a relative line which creates the division into in-
group and out-group by using nomination and predication discursive strategies, 
which have been analysed in the previous chapter, the authors of the examined 
documents formulate several implicit arguments (or, using R. Wodak’s 
terminology, topos) in order to substantiate the process of exclusion. In this 
58 
 
context, several principal discursive practices aimed at justification of the 
construction of the out-group of undocumented migrants can be singled out in 
FRONTEX’ documents.  
 
3.6.1 Constructing the threat for internal security of the EU 
 
The first discursive practice consists in fixing a strong link between the 
phenomenon of migration and the feeling of insecurity (danger) in the opinion of 
the audience addressed by FRONTEX’ discourse. This discursive strategy is in 
fact turning “illegal immigration” into a security threat for the European Union 
and its citizens – throughout the analysed sources, one can sequentially trace 
the idea of presence of some external threat, e.g. like in the following passage 
from the speech of FRONTEX Executive Director I. Laitinen: 
 
We assess what is the likely threat that threatens the external borders, 
border security, and EU citizens from outside. In other words, criminal 
pressure, in terms of illegal migration, human trafficking, and so on, not 
disregarding other types of organized crime and fighting international terrorism 
[Laitinen, 2006] 
 
This quotation gives at once multiple sub-points which are worthy of being 
analysed, as in only several lines we can see all the basic discursive techniques 
applied in order to create a negative and even “criminalized” image of migration 
processes. To start with, the security of the EU citizens is put under direct 
dependence from the security of external borders of the Community. Thus, with 
this way of interpretation, the mission of FRONTEX, which is responsible for 
surveillance of the EU external borders, should be considered as critically 
important as it prevents the mentioned “threat from outside”.  
 
FRONTEX’ discourse contains a certain number of hyperboles, which can be 
found in the phrases which describe the scope of FRONTEX’ activities and 
initially accustom the readers to the feeling of some threat, therefore creating 
security issues. Such words as “exceptional”, “unforeseeable” and 
“unpredictable” regarding the situation at the external borders of the EU, even 
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without direct link to undocumented migration, have the hidden semantic 
inflection of some potential danger to which the European citizens are opposed.   
 
FRONTEX coordinates operational and EU measures to jointly respond to 
exceptional situations at the external borders [FRONTEX, 2013b:7]. 
 
However, past experiences demonstrate that there are a large number of 
unforeseeable events and factors that can have a profound and 
unpredictable impact on the situation at the border [FRONTEX, 2013a:61] 
 
Another way of using hyperbolic devises is often found in connotation with the 
issues of detecting undocumented migrants at the EU external borders. Here, 
the attention should be paid first of all on the repetitive use of the verb to detect 
and all its derivatives (detection, detecting, detected) in FRONTEX’ discourse. 
Taking into account that the word “detect” has the meaning of “discerning 
something hidden or subtle” or even of “learning something hidden or improper” 
[Farlex Thesaurus], and thus has a rather negative notional meaning, the use of 
this word in permanent link with undocumented migrants contributes to the 
negative perception of this issue by the audience. The analysis of FRONTEX’ 
discourse demonstrates also that the word “detect” and its derivatives are 
almost never substituted by the synonyms with more neutral meaning (e.g. find, 
identify or any other words). Furthermore, the examined sources contain 
numerous examples of using various phrases where the word “detection” is 
used in the phrases with such hyperboles as “dramatic”, “unprecedented”, 
“sharp”, “sudden”, “remarkable”, etc. This combination shows to the readers the 
mass character of undocumented migration in the EU and stresses on the 
necessity to react upon this occurrence, as the following extracts illustrate: 
 
Illegal border crossings along the EU external borders dropped sharply in 2012 
to about 72 500 detections, i.e. half the number reported in 2011. The situation 
changed dramatically in August 2012 when the Greek authorities mobilised 
unprecedented resources at their land border with Turkey, including the 
deployment of 1 800 additional police officers. The number of detected illegal 
border crossings rapidly dropped from about 2 000 in the first week of August 
to below 10 per week in October 2012 [FRONTEX, 2013b:9] 
60 
 
 
In 2012, the nationality with the most dramatic change in the number of 
detections were Syrians, both in terms of relative growth and absolute number 
[FRONTEX, 2013a:20] 
 
All maritime assets and crews will be provided by the Italian authorities and will 
patrol a predefined area with a view to detecting and preventing illegitimate 
border crossings to the Pelagic Islands, Sicily and the Italian mainland. 
[FRONTEX, 21 February 2011] 
 
The large and sudden increase of detections in 2011 in the Central 
Mediterranean, in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’ and subsequent departures 
from Tunisia and Libya, had been reduced by the end of the year [FRONTEX, 
2013b:9] 
 
Detections have followed a remarkably seasonal pattern invariably peaking 
in the third quarter of each year and concentrated at the border between 
Greece and Turkey [FRONTEX, 2013a:22]  
 
Moreover, it should be mentioned that in FRONTEX’ discourse even speaking 
about regular migration is referred to the potential risk and is concerned as a 
challenge for the EU, as demonstrates the next extract:  
 
An ever-increasing number of people coming to the EU poses a challenge of 
having less time for the entire process of person and document authentication 
and/verification, and efficiently detecting the “risky” ones, which should undergo 
a more thorough check [FRONTEX, 4 July 2013] 
 
Notwithstanding that FRONTEX’ usual focus of attention is directed towards 
undocumented migration and related problems, topic of regular migration and 
visa regime required for the citizens of the third countries is often touched upon 
in the analyzed sources. Interpretation of the requirements of visa regime in 
FRONTEX’ discourse has a rather uncommon for the EU agency character: 
 
Visa policy acts as a form of pre-entry procedure to ensure that third-country 
nationals comply with entry requirements, which helps to prevent irregular 
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migration. In this respect, particularly important in preventing subsequent 
illegal staying is the role of consular offices in third countries determining 
whether a third-country national should be granted a visa or not [FRONTEX, 
2013a:14] 
 
In this passage, it is clearly indicated that the requirement of obtaining entry 
visas for foreigners is connected exclusively with counteraction to possible 
undocumented migration. At the same time, the official position of the EU 
regarding visa policy, described in the Community Code on Visas, contains 
quite different interpretation, putting on the first place the necessity to further 
travelling of the citizens of the third countries: 
 
As regards visa policy, the establishment of a ‘common corpus’ of legislation … 
is one of the fundamental components of ‘further development of the common 
visa policy as part of a multi-layer system aimed at facilitating legitimate 
travel and tackling illegal immigration through further harmonisation of 
national legislation and handling practices at local consular missions’ [European 
Parliament, 2009:art.3] 
 
In some speeches and interviews of FRONTEX officials, one can find the 
attempts to rehabilitate the position of the agency on interpretation of its 
principal mission. For example, Director of Operations Division K. Roesler gives 
the following explanation: 
 
I would like to underscore that FRONTEX’ mission should not be 
misunderstood – we are committed to facilitate the legal movements and to 
promote fundamental rights; we see borders as connecting people, but we 
[also] have to fight irregular activities and prevent cross-border criminality 
[Deliso, 2011] 
 
However, the analysis of FRONTEX documents gives quite another impression. 
Thus, all the passages dealing with visa procedures suggest an implicit idea 
which represents even regular migrants as potential infringers of the European 
laws:  
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Member States have introduced a variety of specific measures in their visa-
issuing procedures to tackle irregular migration, which includes the 
assessment of willingness to return, the training of personnel at embassies and 
consulates, and cooperation and information exchange with other entities and 
Member States. Other preventive measures include the use of biometric data 
in the visa application process, as well as the identification of specific categories 
of migrants who might misuse their visa and awareness raising in third 
countries of the consequences of making fraudulent applications [FRONTEX, 
2013a:13] 
 
Moreover, “illegal migration” is viewed as one of the manifestations of the 
external “criminal pressure” and is placed in one line with international terrorism, 
international organized crime and human trafficking. Even if it is clear that the 
majority of undocumented migrants are not implicated in the mentioned criminal 
activities, this repetitive connotation in FRONTEX’ discourse creates a steady 
connexion in the mind of the readers, as it can be observed in the following 
extract:  
 
FRONTEX develops capacities at the Member State and European level as 
combined instruments to tackle the challenges of migration flows and 
serious organised crime and terrorism at the external borders [FRONTEX, 
2013b, 7] 
 
The way of generalization of all undocumented migrants in FRONTEX 
publications by relating them with illegal activities as smuggling, terrorism or 
other criminal acts, is supposed to justify the necessity of counteraction against 
the migrants. Next passage shows how the problem of immigration is 
represented as the major security concern in ensuring border control:  
 
Preventing illegal flows involving mobility that is temporary (for instance 
smuggling or activities related to crime or to terrorism movements) or more 
long-term (in the form of illegal migration) - is generally thought of as one 
main task, if not the one, of border control [FRONTEX, 2011b:5] 
 
63 
 
To demonstrate the agency’s readiness to oppose to this “threat”, the authors of 
the analysed documents are using rather bellicose expressions, which would be 
probably more appropriate and pertinent in the context of some military 
operations than while speaking about ensuring border control. The use of such 
words as “combat”, “suppression” and “cross-border crime” in migration context 
in the following extract is creating an extremely unfavorable connotation and 
placing undocumented immigration in one line with such heavy infringements of 
international law as human trafficking: 
 
The purpose of the arrangement5 was to establish a framework for 
cooperation between these two institutions facilitating the prevention, 
detection and suppression of cross-border crime, in particular in terms of 
border security to combat illegal immigration, smuggling of people and 
trafficking in human beings [FRONTEX, 29 May 2009] 
 
Furthermore, FRONTEX Executive Director I. Laitinen in one of his speeches, 
talking about risk assessment activities of the agency, is completing the 
enumeration of external “threats’ for the EU in the context of “criminal pressure”, 
mentioning first of all “illegal migration” altogether with organized crime and 
even terrorism: 
 
We assess what is the likely threat that threatens the external borders, border 
security, and EU citizens from outside. In other words, criminal pressure, in 
terms of illegal migration, human trafficking, and so on, not disregarding other 
types of organized crime and fighting international terrorism [Laitinen, 2006] 
 
The mechanism of representation of undocumented migration in connexion with 
various dangerous criminal activities is actually shifting the focus of attention of 
the discourse audience. In this case, the matter concerns not simply ensuring 
border control in order to prevent the entry of undocumented migrants, who 
obviously do not correspond to the legal entry requirements of the EU, but as it 
is described in the following passage, “illegal flows” of migrants are directly 
connected by the authors with the “fields of crime and security”: 
                                                          
5
 The matter concerns signing the working arrangement on cooperation between FRONTEX and 
INTERPOL on 27 May 2009.  
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… illegal flows across EU borders whose aim and/or methodology is concerned 
with temporary flows – specifically, related to smuggling, organised crime 
and terrorism. These three causes all fall under the fields of crime and 
security and, as such, are of particular concern to those involved in the 
management of border security [FRONTEX, 2011b:31] 
 
The idea of presence of some external threat at the borders of the EU is 
essential also for FRONTEX’ risk analysis concepts. However, it is of high 
importance to stress the fact that “irregular migration” and “security threats” are 
normally not at all identical notions, as it can be seen in the following quote 
where these two domains of FRONTEX activities are clearly separated: 
 
The ARA6 2013 concentrates on the current scope of FRONTEX operational 
activities, which focus on irregular migration at the external borders of the EU 
and the Schengen Associated Countries. Central to the concept of integrated 
border management (IBM), border management should also cover security 
threats present at the external borders [FRONTEX, 2013a:8] 
 
Thus, it would be obvious to say that aspiring to enter the territory of the EU 
undocumented migrants cannot be related without any reserve with such real 
security threats as international terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, 
etc. At the same time, as it has been demonstrated above, in many of the 
analysed sources these two spheres of FRONTEX’ activities are described as 
some common aspects of a general security threat.  The problem is constructed 
in the way which establishes the connexion between ensuring security of the 
EU and fight against illegal border-crossings, as demonstrates the next 
passage: 
 
Regular travel represents the vast majority of border crossing events (BCEs). 
However, such crossings are standard and the major issue for Border Guards is 
that of facilitation, whereas illegal BCEs, despite their being only a fraction of 
the number of border transactions, actually demand more stringent attention to 
ensure security [FRONTEX, 2013a:10] 
                                                          
6
 Annual Risk Analysis  
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3.6.2 Security, threat and risk conceptions in FRONTEX’ discourse 
 
Speaking about security aspect in FRONTEX’ discourse, it is noteworthy to 
analyse the terms which are used in the agency’s papers. Ultimately, the 
authors of the documents are operating with three conceptual notions: security, 
threat and risk. According to A. Neal, at the time of creating the agency there 
was an evident prevalence of the concept of risk which can signify a “move 
away from the political spectacle of the security emergency in favour of a 
quieter and more technocratic approach” [Neal, 2009:348]. As a proof of his 
statement, the author has underlined that, for example, in the Regulation on the 
establishment of FRONTEX the term “security” was used only once while the 
term “risk” appears nine times [Ibid]. Indeed, security is mentioned in the 
Regulation only in the general context of the EU “area of freedom, security and 
justice” [Council of the European Union, 2004:349/2]. At the same time, a 
significant part of the Regulation is dedicated to risk analysis model as one of 
the main FRONTEX’ tasks aimed at elaboration of necessary measures which 
can be undertaken against probable threats: 
 
… agency should carry out risk analyses in order to provide the Community and 
the Member States with adequate information to allow for appropriate 
measures to be taken or to tackle identified threats and risks with a view to 
improving the integrated management of external borders [Council of the 
European Union, 2004:349/1] 
 
Indeed, risk analysis is considered as a crucial element of the agency’s work, 
being the “starting point for all FRONTEX’ activities, from joint operations 
through training to research studies” [FRONTEX website]. Furthermore, it 
constitutes an integral aspect of constituting FRONTEX’ epistemic power taking 
into consideration that more than any other publications of the agency, risk 
analysis reports are distributed among a “wide range of partners”:  border 
control authorities both within the Schengen area and at the external borders, 
as well as Member State actors in cooperating neighbouring countries and non-
EU states farther afield [Ibid]. The ultimate importance of FRONTEX’ risk 
analysis is stipulated by the fact that the conclusions and assumptions made by 
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the agency’s experts are used by “decision-makers in setting priorities, 
developing counter-measures and determining future goals” as well as to 
“underpin planning for other activities such as training, or research and 
development” [Ibid]. Therefore, by diffusing its ideas through risk analysis 
publications and recommendations for decision-making actors of security field, 
FRONTEX has an opportunity to realize its indirect epistemic power. In this 
context, it would be appropriate to see what is implied by the authors of 
FRONTEX papers when they are using the term “risk”, especially having in 
mind the above-mentioned correlation between security and risk in FRONTEX’ 
discourse. That is how the authors of the agency’s report define the key 
conceptions:  
 
… management approach to risk analysis defines risk as a function of the 
threat, vulnerability and impact. ‘Threat’ is a force or pressure acting upon 
the external borders that is characterised by both its magnitude and likelihood; 
‘vulnerability’ is defined as the capacity of a system to mitigate the threat and 
‘impact’ is determined as the potential consequences of the threat [FRONTEX,  
2013a:11] 
 
This definition explicitly demonstrates that in FRONTEX’ terminological system 
risk is directly related with threat: the main function of risk analysis is to detect 
the possible threats, find the ways to mitigate them and foreknow their probable 
consequences in order to minimize their negative effects. Coming back to  
A. Neal’s conclusion that the shift from using the term security towards  
the “quieter” notion of risk, observed in 2004 in the Regulation on establishment 
of FRONTEX, meant a diversion from security emergency context, it will be also 
equitable to say that this terminological change does not necessarily mean a 
real evolution of views within the EU security field. The central idea of mitigation 
of possible threats has always been present in the core of FRONTEX’ risk 
analysis activities and, moreover, it is tightly connected with security context, as 
illustrates the next abstract 
 
A coherent and full analysis of the risks affecting security at the external 
borders requires, above all, the adoption of common indicators. The analysis 
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will need to identify the risks that arise at the external borders themselves and 
those that arise in third countries [FRONTEX, 2013a:9] 
 
In order to compare the correlation between the terms of risk and security in 
FRONTEX’ constitutive documents, three more Regulations of the European 
Parliament and of the Council were analysed in this dissertation. The number of 
times when the mentioned terms are used in the documents is given in the table 
below. 
 
Constitutive document Security Risk 
Regulation No 2007 (26.10.2004) 1 9 
Regulation No 863 (11.07.2007) 1 1 
Regulation No 1168 (25.10.2011) 10 14 
Regulation No 1052 (22.10.2013) 7 10 
 
The relevant changes of the number of times of using the term “risk” is of little 
interest in this case, as almost every time the context of its application refers to 
risk analysis undertaken by the agency. As it has already been mentioned 
above, FRONTEX risk analysis is focused on possible security threats and, 
thus, contributes as well to “construction” of security issues and representation 
of undocumented migration as its integral part. However, the evolution of the 
context in which the authors of FRONTEX’ constitutive documents are using the 
term “security” is revealing the process which A. Neal called “return of security” 
to FRONTEX’ discourse. Already in 2007, even if the notion security appears in 
the Regulation only once, the context is completely different in comparison with 
the previous document (2004):  
 
Effective management of the external borders through checks and 
surveillance helps to combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human 
beings and to prevent any threat to the internal security, public policy, 
public health and international relations of the Member States. Border 
control is in the interests not only of the Member State at whose external 
borders it is carried out but of all Member States which have abolished internal 
border control [Council of European Union, 2007:199/30] 
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It is noteworthy to pay attention to placing “illegal immigration’ in one line with 
trafficking in human beings, which serves as one more of the numerous 
examples of creating the negative connotation of migration phenomena with 
criminal activities, as well as to the choice of the verb with a very strong 
“militarized” meaning – to combat. However, the major observation to make 
while reading the cited above extract is that external borders’ management is 
considered as a direct guarantee of internal security of the European Union, as 
well as to such vital spheres as public health, public policy and even 
international relations of the Member States. In this way, the audience of the 
discourse can make a straightforward conclusion: undocumented migration 
presents a direct security threat to the EU countries, and therefore to the EU 
citizens. This “internalizing” the possible effects of ensuring external borders 
management as a reaction towards security threats, when undocumented 
migrants are represented as a menace to internal security of the European 
Union, is a rather wide-spread technique used in FRONTEX’ discourse. In the 
next paragraph, for example, the matter concerns the persons who enter the EU 
with false documents and, according to the authors of the document, present a 
serious threat: 
 
Document fraudsters not only undermine border security but also the internal 
security of the EU [FRONTEX, 2013a:63] 
 
When a reader meets up an expression like “undermine internal security”, the 
created image is the one of massive illegal entry of immigrants who threaten the 
well-being of the EU citizens. The question to put in this context is whether 
illegal border crossings are so numerous to be capable to threaten seriously the 
internal security of the Member States? As it has been already explained in the 
previous chapter, this figure is quite insignificant (see p.54) and the proof of this 
fact can be even found in FRONTEX’ documents, which define illegal border-
crossings (BCEs) as “only a fraction”: 
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Whereas illegal BCEs, despite their being only a fraction of the number of 
border transactions, actually demand more stringent attention to ensure security 
[FRONTEX, 2011b:10] 
 
However, the thesis about a serious threat to internal security of the EU 
countries is running all through FRONTEX discourse. It can be revealed, for 
example, in the speech of I. Laitinen dedicated to the necessity of creating 
uniform law enforcement system in the EU states and its neighboring countries:    
 
We must understand that border security does not start and does not end 
at the border. It is just one area in which we are performing our duties. There 
should be no barriers between law enforcement in the Member States and Third 
Countries [Laitinen, 2006] 
 
Thereby, already in 2007 the connotation between “threats’ caused by the 
phenomenon of undocumented migration was related with internal security of 
the European Union. In posterior constitutive documents (2011, 2013) the 
notion of security appears many more times in the context of “security of 
external borders”, “security principles and standards” and what is remarkable, 
for the first time in FRONTEX’ discourse, the matter concerns also the right of 
undocumented migrants to “liberty and security” especially during joint return 
operations conducted by the agency (the reasons of such a novelty in the 
discourse will be analysed in the next chapter dedicated to FRONTEX’ 
humanitarian discursive practices). Thus, FRONTEX’ discourse is operating 
with an argumentative scheme which emphasizes the presence of an external 
threat caused by undocumented migration by paying particular attention to its 
influence on internal security of the Member States. The representation of 
migration as a security issue and the construction of the image of insecurity in 
the minds of the audience addressed by the discourse serve as a justification 
for exclusionary practices towards undocumented migrants.  
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3.7 Discursive strategy of perspectivization and mitigation  
 
After having analysed the argumentative discursive strategy which represents 
undocumented migration as a security issue in order to substantiate the social 
exclusion of immigrants, it is also reasonable to examine FRONTEX’ discourse 
to see on whom the responsibility for “illegal border crossing events” is 
predominantly placed. It is essential to mention here that by identifying 
undocumented migration alongside with such crimes as international terrorism, 
human trafficking, smuggling, etc. and therefore contributing to criminalization of 
migration, FRONTEX clearly singles out a group of persons responsible for 
illegal BCEs – “facilitators of illegal migration”.  In what follows, the analysis of 
the agency’s documents will show two discursive practices: criminalization of 
facilitators and victimization of undocumented immigrants. 
 
3.7.1 Criminalization of undocumented migration vs victimization of 
immigrants 
 
Facilitation of undocumented immigration, according to the authors of 
FRONTEX’ publications, is considered as one of the types of “serious organized 
crime”, as it follows from the next passage: 
 
As is true for other serious organised crimes, facilitators of irregular 
migration make an extensive use of the internet according to Europol reports 
[FRONTEX, 2013:36] 
 
In this context, criminalization of immigration plays also its important role in 
construction of some sort of the out-group and in its contraposition to security of 
the EU citizens. In the following extract, FRONTEX Executive Director | 
I. Laitinen is speaking about facilitators of undocumented migration, putting 
them and, implicitly, the migrants themselves on the “opposite side” of the 
border: 
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In a way we are all on one side of the border together and on the opposite 
side are the criminal organisations who are exploiting and abusing people 
for their own purposes [FRONTEX, 2010a:13]  
 
The facilitators of immigration are represented as the members of “criminal 
organisations”, while those citizens of the third countries who are heading to 
enter the European Union without required authorization with the help of these 
organizations are defined as “exploited” and “abused” victims of facilitators. This 
manner of representation is common for all FRONTEX’ documents which 
describe facilitators as a well-organized network with strong hierarchy and 
distribution of duties between leaders, their subordinates and even “local 
agents” who live in the EU countries and assist in reception of undocumented 
migrants: 
 
Facilitation of irregular immigration is usually nationality- or ethnicity- based 
and the OCGs7 are hierarchically structured. The leader is responsible for the 
coordination of the smuggling throughout a certain territory, and has 
international contacts with other networks doing other parts of the smuggling 
action, and with coordinators in other countries. The leader coordinates drivers, 
guides, providers of accommodation often assisted by ‘local agents’ 
[FRONTEX, 2013a:36] 
 
By the example of Bangladeshi migrants, FRONTEX’ discourse demonstrates 
how facilitators are taking advantage of unfavorable conditions of life of 
deprived population in the poor countries to “deceptively” convince them that 
leaving for more prosperous European states is the best solution in this 
situation: 
 
Following the economic crisis in the area, salaries fell and fewer jobs were 
available; consequently, many migrants decided to try to reach the EU in 
search of better employment opportunities. It was established that facilitators 
working in the Gulf area deceptively assured the migrants that there were 
plenty of good jobs and high salaries in Greece [FRONTEX, 2013a:26] 
 
                                                          
7
 Organized crime groups 
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Naturally, the poorest people, often having no access to any other information, 
rely on facilitators and take decision to try to enter the territory of the EU with 
their help and, as it becomes clear from the next extract, have to pay a 
tremendous for the living standards in their home countries amount of money. 
Representing immigrants as victims of criminal organizations, whose real goal is 
to use their “clients” as the objects of sex trade or forced labour, FRONTEX’ 
discourse contains a very clear distinction between facilitators and 
undocumented migrants by opposing “unscrupulous smugglers” to “desperate” 
and “vulnerable people”. According to FRONTEX Deputy Executive Director 
G.A. Fernandez, undocumented migrants are often exposed to unbearable 
conditions of transportation, which can unfortunately bring to their death, like it 
happens, for example, with Afghani migrants: 
 
Facilitators lure … desperate people with the promise of an easy crossing and 
a better life, and charge up to USD 7,500 for a trip from Afghanistan. This is not 
always the case. Tragically, since the beginning of the year 41 people lost their 
lives trying to cross the Evros river or the sea in the area of Alexandropouli, 
many more die as a result of the dangerous forms of transport used by 
unscrupulous smugglers, others still end up victims of trafficking for the 
sex trade or in forced labour [FRONTEX, 30 November 2010] 
 
Here is another example of the “double” discursive strategy of victimization of 
migrants (vulnerable people who have to undertake the “harsh and dangerous 
journey”) and criminalization of traffickers:   
 
As more information was received, verified and analysed, it was possible to 
build a picture of the criminal infrastructure which had launched so many 
vulnerable people on a harsh and dangerous journey. As a result, a number 
of the unscrupulous ‘facilitators’ who took money from desperate people 
unaware of the dangers they faced were arrested [FRONTEX, 2010a:36]  
 
Furthermore, in numerous publications and interviews FRONTEX’ officials are 
consequently reproducing the idea of guiltlessness of undocumented migrants 
placing all responsibility for possible negative effects of immigration on 
facilitators who are using all available tools to deceive, intimidate and exploit the 
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immigrants in their criminal purposes. In the following passage, Head of 
Operational Analysis and Evaluation Sector A. Saccone describes potential 
undocumented immigrants as ambitious persons striving for better life 
conditions in one of the EU countries and are sometimes obliged to ask for help 
of the “criminal world of facilitators” that results in falling under complete 
dependence on the criminals and having to fulfill all their orders:    
 
Maybe you are an ambitious person living abroad, but you look for an 
opportunity to work in the EU. You get in touch with this criminal world of 
the facilitators. And from that contact, a lot of things will happen. They will 
take your real passport, they will give you a false passport, they will 
blackmail your family if you don’t pay. But if you pay, they promise you some 
sort of job at the other end. It is the start of an unequal relationship that leaves 
people at the mercy of criminals [FRONTEX, 2010a:51] 
 
FRONTEX’ discourse also demonstrates in a clear way what happens with 
undocumented migrants as soon as they manage to enter the EU territory and 
are, since this moment, “lacking residency status, and, therefore, vulnerable to 
exploitation” [FRONTEX, 2013a:24]. An important observation to make here is 
that the agency’s discourse emphasizes the fact the all the most serious 
negative consequences for undocumented immigrants take place already in 
Europe, after their transportation from their home countries. From the other 
hand, stressing on this idea contributes as well in forming a public thought 
about potential danger of undocumented migration as it is connected with illegal 
activities on the territory of the EU. The next passage from the interview with 
FRONTEX Operations Division Director K. Roesler can serve as an example of 
transmission of the described discursive technique:  
 
We know how it goes: people in their home country are given an offer to get 
into Europe, where they are told they will be able to work and make money for 
their families; they are provided a ride, but then the amount requested is not 
enough… the whole family or clan is ordered to contribute more money to the 
traffickers. And after they do, it is still not enough, and then when the migrants 
get to Europe, that is where often the true slavery starts. The trafficked 
74 
 
persons have to keep making money for the trafficking organizations [Deliso, 
2011] 
 
This extract, in fact, shows once again how FRONTEX discourse relieves the 
responsibility of undocumented migrants by describing them as decent persons 
whose only aim is to “be able to work and make money for their families” and 
who are exploited by the traffickers. This way of representation of 
undocumented migrants as victims of the “criminal network” of “unscrupulous” 
facilitators moves aside the attention from the voluntary choice and decision 
made by the immigrants themselves. Furthermore, the agency’s publications 
abound in description of cases of cruel treatment of the immigrants which are 
often exposed to different kinds of exploitation. The following example illustrates 
the dreadful consequences for women who can be involved in prostitution to be 
able to pay the facilitators for their transportation to one of the EU countries: 
 
A woman trafficked into prostitution in an EU country will have to work ten 
hours a day and have at least 20 customers per day in order to pay back 
the facilitators who organized her entry into the EU. And she will have to do 
this six days a week for 52 weeks a year, no holidays. At 50 Euros per 
customer, she ends up giving the facilitator around 300,000 Euros in one a year 
to pay off her debt [FRONTEX, 2010a:50]  
 
There are obviously some cases when women are forced to prostitute by being 
threatened and blackmailed by their traffickers. There is as well no doubt that 
the awful conditions of life and work in which these women find themselves 
must be condemned and fought against as far as possible. However,  
the manner of describing the situation so much one-sidedly as it is made in the 
analysed paragraph, when undocumented migrants are represented as victims 
of traffickers, overlooks an essential point – it is often a choice made by 
migrants themselves when they take a decision to go to the EU countries 
without required legal authorization. Having no other means to pay for their 
transportation to Europe, they are obliged to be involved in various criminal 
activities, but the responsibility in this case is shared between them and 
facilitators. By using this discursive technique, the authors of FRONTEX’ 
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publications achieve two goals at once – first of all, they focus attention on 
victimized status of undocumented migrants. In this context, FRONTEX 
discourse makes a special emphasis on the danger for one of the most 
vulnerable groups exploited by traffickers – unaccompanied minors – who 
should be “efficiently protected” from any infringements of their health or any 
kinds of possible exploitation. One of the FRONTEX’ press releases contains 
the following information:  
 
Unaccompanied minors represent a particularly vulnerable group that are 
open to sexual, economic or criminal exploitation, including the removal of 
organs and as such constitute a population which should be more efficiently 
protected. Though criminal networks are heavily involved in human 
trafficking and people-smuggling into the EU, among the exploiters taking 
advantage of children are sometimes their own relatives [FRONTEX, 13 
December 2010] 
 
The topic of possible exploitation and “illegal transportation” of minors can be 
observed as well in other FRONTEX’ publications. This emphasis on the most 
vulnerable group of undocumented migrants has the potential impact on 
emotional perception of this information by the readers and therefore can assist 
in achieving the goal of shaping the understanding that FRONTEX’ activities are 
directed most of all on protection of immigrants’ lives and health and those of 
children in particular. While saying this, the authors of FRONTEX’ publications 
do not focus attention on the content of “appropriate steps” which should be 
taken by border guards – the reader’s attention is focused exclusively on the 
idea of saving children’s lives. The following extract gives an example of such 
discursive strategy: 
 
For reasons of child welfare, the emphasis throughout the operation was on 
crime prevention rather than investigation of criminals, by ensuring that 
vulnerable children at risk of being trafficked into the EU were identified at the 
earliest possible juncture and appropriate steps taken [FRONTEX, 19 January 
2011] 
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Secondly, the mentioned discursive technique contributes as well to securitizing 
immigration in the minds of audience. As it is mentioned in the interview of  
K. Roesler (see p. 74), “when the migrants get to Europe, that is where often 
the true slavery starts”. Therefore, the audience of FRONTEX’ discourse is 
supposed to come to the conclusion that undocumented migration presents a 
threat to internal security of the EU and thus should be prevented.  At the same 
time, facilitators are described in the following passages as dishonest criminals 
who stay insecure while putting migrants’ lives in danger: 
 
Widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and document fraud to 
mimic legal entry to the EU, which results in facilitators being able to operate 
remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompanying migrants during 
high-risk activities such as border-crossing [FRONTEX, 2013a:35]. 
 
This method (of transportation) requires migrants to stay in confinement for long 
periods of time, and is known to put migrants lives at risk of suffocation and 
dehydration [FRONTEX, 2013a:34]  
 
Sometimes, however, traffickers can accompany the immigrants on their route 
towards Europe, for example during crossing the sea by boats, but in this case 
they present direct danger also to border guards. That is how I. Laitinen 
describes an incident which happened during FRONTEX sea operation 
Poseidon in 2011 when traffickers started to shoot to Greek frontier guards:   
 
This case shows that facilitators have no scruples. They open fire on 
border guards, they expose migrants’ life to danger sending them to the 
open seas [FRONTEX, 20 May 2011] 
 
The episteme of insecurity is presented here in two aspects – it demonstrates 
the evident danger for European border guards and contributes as well to 
victimization of immigrants. Undocumented migrants in FRONTEX’ discourse 
are described in this context as the persons “in distress” undergoing a serious 
risk of life because of unsafe conditions of transportation to which they are 
exposed, especially in the sea, as the next passage illustrates: 
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The migrants arriving in Italy and Malta mostly use wooden fishing boats which 
are often overcrowded and thus prone to sinking or capsizing in high-sea 
conditions and are often ill-equipped with poor engines and navigation 
systems; two factors contributing to the risk to life. As a result of these 
practices, tens of thousands of people become the subject of search-and-
rescue (SAR) in the Mediterranean every year. FRONTEX operations took part 
in almost 900 SAR cases off Europe’s southern borders between 2011 and 
2013, affecting almost 50,000 people in distress [FRONTEX, 4 October 2013] 
 
3.7.2 Humanitarian component in FRONTEX’ discourse 
 
This paragraph contains another essential idea of the agency’s discourse – this 
way of presenting FRONTEX’ activities creates an impression that the main 
task of border guards lies mostly not in non-admission of undocumented 
migrants on EU territory but in protection of their lives especially in the situation 
of calamity or shipwrecks. Therefore, the use of term “search-and-rescue 
operations” multiples this effect by presenting FRONTEX’ operations more as 
rescue activities than as border protection mission. This tactics demonstrates 
well the example of retreat from the principle of epistemic validity. Obviously, 
this does not mean that border guards involved in FRONTEX’ sea operations 
are not making every effort to save undocumented migrants’ lives. However, 
this way of presenting the agency’s operational activities draws away attention 
of the audience from the fact that FRONTEX’ principal task is “tackling the 
problems encountered at external borders” [Council of the European Union, 
2004:349/5] and not conducting life-saving operations. Moreover, in order to 
reinforce the effect caused by the description of dangerous and sometimes 
mortal conditions of transportation of undocumented migrants to Europe,  
the agency’s reports and publication are amplified with evidences of the border 
guards who were taking part in FRONTEX’ sea operations. This technique 
manages to “brighten up” the monotonous language of FRONTEX’ documents 
and to make the expressed ideas more accessible to being perceived by the 
audience. Here are several examples of narratives of FRONTEX’ Sea 
Operations Officers: 
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I was on mission last week. Thunderstorm with hail. We got the call that there 
was a search and rescue case. We started looking just as the weather got very 
bad. Out of 12 people who were reported missing, eight of them had been 
washed dead onto the shore. Among these there was a seven-year-old girl. I 
helped the coast guard put her into a body-bag. This girl had been promised 
heaven in the European Union, but she had been cheated of her life. She 
paid to be dead. The facilitators, the people traffickers, left her to die. It’s 
very painful, very distressing [FRONTEX, 2010a:35] 
 
It is very painful to pick up dead people, to know that other people are 
missing. Of course we feel. Of course we have feelings, of course it is 
frightening when you see people in boats like this [FRONTEX, 2010a:32] 
 
These horrifying evidences make the ideas contained in FRONTEX’ discourse 
more comprehensible for the audience whose normal reaction would be to feel 
at once compassion for dead and injured undocumented migrants, contempt for 
traffickers who “promised heaven in the European Union”  for immigrants who 
were instead “cheated of their lives”, and finally respect and admiration for 
border guards who are saving human lives. Fight against undocumented 
immigration, following the logic of FRONTEX’ discourse, will first of all allow 
avoiding numerous migrants’ deaths, as it is declared in the following extract: 
 
If this flow could be stemmed, not only would a major irregular immigration route 
to Europe be closed, but thousands of deaths by drowning could be 
prevented each year as overloaded boats (sometimes with more than one 
hundred people jammed aboard) set out on a long and treacherous journey 
[FRONTEX, 2010a:31] 
 
The discursive technique, which emphasizes FRONTEX’ activities which are 
aimed at saving immigrants’ lives, has been called by K. Horsti “humanitarian 
discourse legitimating migration control” [Horsti, 2012]. Indeed, humanitarian 
context is successfully used by the authors of FRONTEX’ publications in order 
to substantiate carrying out various operational activities and even those of 
extraterritorial scope (beyond EU territory), like it was for example in the case of 
the operation Hera III. The principal reason for this operation is defined in the 
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agency’s press release as prevention of migrants from undertaking a “long sea 
journey” for reducing the “danger of losses of human lives”: 
 
The focus of the operation will be joint patrols by aerial and naval means of 
Spain, Italy, Luxembourg and France along the coast of West Africa. The aim of 
these patrols, carried out with Senegalese authorities, will be to stop migrants 
from leaving the shores on the long sea journey and thus reducing the 
danger of losses of human lives [FRONTEX, 15 February 2007] 
 
As it was declared by I. Laitinen after the end of the operation, its conducting 
has managed to save more than a thousand human lives: 
 
Very low numbers of illegal migrants arriving to the Canary Islands and more 
than a thousand of human lives saved – that is the outcome of Frontex 
coordinated operation Hera III. The total of 1167 migrants were diverted back to 
their points of departure at ports at the West African coast, thus preventing 
them to risk their lives on the dangerous journey [FRONTEX, 13 April 2007] 
 
3.7.3 Respect for human rights as the “crucial principle” for FRONTEX 
 
Likewise the given above example, FRONTEX’ discourse contains plentiful 
mentions of humanitarian nature of the agency’s activities. According to  
I. Laitinen, the principle of humanity and respect for human rights is essential for 
border control operations: 
 
The respect of fundamental rights is a crucial part of the European border 
control service. The latter, as stressed in our policy documents, must be 
characterized – in the first instance – by the principle of humanity [Tondini, 
2010] 
 
Furthermore, the agency’s activities in the sphere of border management are 
based on the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, as it is 
declared in FRONTEX’ General Report 2012: 
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FRONTEX supports, coordinates and develops European border management 
in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU [FRONTEX, 
2013b:7]  
 
It should be also mentioned that any violation of fundamental human rights of 
undocumented migrants is categorically denied as well in FRONTEX’ note to 
the European Parliament (08 October 2010), which states that effective border 
management and respect to human rights “go hand in hand”: 
 
The respect of Fundamental Rights (…) is unconditional for FRONTEX and 
is fully integrated into its activities. In fact, FRONTEX considers the respect and 
promotion of fundamental rights as integral part of an effective border 
management and both concepts go, therefore, hand in hand [Keller et al. 
2011:22] 
 
The same idea is repeated by Director of Operations Divisions K. Roesler who 
simultaneously propagates at once three discursive practices of FRONTEX – 
massive character of immigration to Europe (“huge amount”), separation on in- 
and out-groups of Europeans and undocumented migrants by welfare rate 
(“poor people”) and finally denial of any infringements of human rights of the 
immigrants, calling it a part of FRONTEX’ portfolio and emphasizing the 
importance of cooperation with human rights organizations: 
 
If we consider the huge amount of poor people who want to go to the EU, 
who are willing to risk everything for that, we cannot ignore the 
responsibility to respect the fundamental rights of those in need. This is a 
basic element in all joint operations coordinated by FRONTEX. It is a part of 
our ‘portfolio’ to liaise with human rights organizations such as the 
UNHCR, and to get their input and expertise. And again, in this respect we 
provided added value [Doriso, 2011] 
 
As the practical realization of the declared principles of the supremacy of 
human rights in the agency’s activities, the Management Board of FRONTEX 
adopted in 2011 the Fundamental Rights Strategy with the aim “to prevent 
possible violations of fundamental rights during (…) operations by, on one hand, 
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developing the requisite knowledge and skills of participating officers and, on 
the other, implementing proper monitoring mechanisms based on reporting to 
the competent authorities and sanctioning, applying a zero tolerance policy” 
[FRONTEX, 2011a:1]. According to one of its provisions, “FRONTEX is to adopt 
and to display an exemplary attitude based on concrete practical initiatives, and 
the adoption and promotion of the highest standards in border management 
practices, allowing for transparency and public scrutiny of its activities” 
[FRONTEX, 2011a:2]. In this context, one of the agency’s press releases 
expresses an idea which should be analyzed in a rather skeptical way:  
 
Its endorsement represents a further important step in FRONTEX’s ongoing 
efforts to formalise an emphasis on fundamental rights at every level of its 
activities. This is part of a gradual process rather than a sudden change of 
policy [FRONTEX, 4 April 2011] 
 
The principal point here is to emphasize that respect for human rights has 
always been at FRONTEX’ centre of attention and that adoption of 
Fundamental Rights Strategy should be considered only as “formalisation” of 
the “gradual process” and not as a “sudden change of policy”. However, the 
initial constitutive documents of the agency practically do not refer to respect for 
human rights. Thus, the Regulation 2007/2004 establishing FRONTEX contains 
only one provision (Article 22) which declares observance of EU legal norms in 
the sphere of human rights in a common way for other EU agencies and bodies 
without making any special accent on specificity of FRONTEX’ mission and the 
protection of immigrants’ rights: 
 
This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognised by Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [Council of the European 
Union, 2004:349/2]  
 
It would be more logical therefore to assume that the episteme of respect for 
human rights has been included in FRONTEX’ discourse after the agency’s first 
joint operations (especially Hera I and Hera II), which were severely criticized by 
human rights organizations and pro-migrants groups for infringement of 
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fundamental rights of undocumented migrants. Under this pressure and being 
influenced as well by the Member States, FRONTEX has included in its 
discourse the humanitarian component which was supposed to mitigate the 
criticism. This position was supported by the Council of EU and the European 
Parliament - the amended Regulation of FRONTEX activities in 2011 contains 
already several direct demands to respect fundamental rights of immigrants:  
 
The development of a forward-looking and comprehensive European migration 
policy, based on human rights, solidarity and responsibility, especially for 
those Member States facing specific and disproportionate pressures, remains a 
key policy objective for the Union [Council of the European Union, 2011:304/1]  
 
Union policy in the field of the external borders aims at an integrated border 
management Ensuring that all measures taken are proportionate to the 
objectives pursued, are effective and fully respect fundamental rights and 
the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, including in particular the 
prohibition of refoulement [Council of the European Union, 2011:304/2] 
 
Establishing cooperation with third countries is also relevant with regard to 
promoting Union standards of border management, including respect for 
fundamental rights and human dignity [Council of the European Union, 
2011:304/3] 
 
The analysis of FRONTEX’ discourse has therefore shown how the 
humanitarian aspect of the agency’s operational activities and the episteme of 
respect for fundamental rights are aimed at distracting attention of the audience 
from the real matter of joint return operations and to present FRONTEX’ 
activities as the indispensable element of saving immigrants’ lives and non-
admission of their exploitation by the criminal circles of traffickers.  
 
4. Conclusion and discussion 
 
The analysis of FRONTEX’ discourse on illegal migration, which has been 
undertaken in this dissertation, has given an opportunity to examine the most 
important and frequent discursive practices and techniques which are applied 
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by the agency’s researchers and experts during elaboration and subsequent 
transmission of certain understandings and ideas in the domain of 
undocumented migration and control of the external borders of the European 
Union. The five-stage model of discourse analysis suggested by R. Wodak 
allowed to effectuate profound analysis of the broad specter of sources and 
single out several essential subjects (topos) which are regularly adverted to in 
FRONTEX’ discourse. The special focus which has been made on using 
various rhetorical devises in the agency’s discourse (metaphors, hyperboles, 
superlative forms of adjectives, etc.), in the contrast with highly “officialised” and 
sometimes “managerial” language which is distinctive for FRONTEX’ 
documents and publications, has revealed the topics which evidently present 
particular interest for the agency.  
 
In the beginning of this dissertation it has been suggested that a broader and 
more comprehensive conception of power, than those which have been already 
used in the existing literature, should be applied in order to be able to analyse 
the power of FRONTEX on a more subtle and invisible level. Thus, the 
conception of epistemic power has allowed investigating discursive practices 
through which FRONTEX has the possibility to construct specific problems, 
propose the ways of their solution, shape understandings and fix meanings 
among the audience of its discourse on the issues which are important for the 
agency. In this chapter of the dissertation, the compilation of FRONTEX’ 
principal discursive practices will be worked out in the framework of epistemic 
power of the agency which is constituted through its public discourse.  Having in 
mind that epistemes present “background intersubjective knowledge – collective 
understandings and discourse – that adopt the form of human dispositions and 
practices that human beings use to make sense of the world” [Adler and 
Bernstein, 2005:295], FRONTEX’ discursive practices will be classified to reveal 
which epistemes are constructed in the agency’s discourse and therefore 
through which of them FRONTEX’ epistemic power can be constituted. 
According to V. Schmidt, the discursive processes help explain why certain 
ideas succeed and the others fail because of the ways in which they are 
projected to whom and where – but the discourse itself, as representation as 
well as process, also needs to be evaluated as to why it succeeds or fails in 
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promoting ideas [Schimdt, 208:309]. Taking this into account, the influence of 
certain discursive practices on the concrete activities in the framework of the 
epistemes, which are constructed in FRONTEX’ discourse, will be discussed.  
The generalizing table given below provides a classification of the agency’s 
major discursive practices and traces their compliance to more general 
“epistemes”, which should to be understood here as the system of collective 
understandings among the audience of FRONTEX’ discourse. Taking into 
consideration the fact, that the audience of the agency’s discourse includes 
numerous actors, the key addresses of each discursive practice is also defined.  
 
This table shows the paradox of discrepancy between two major epistemes 
constructed through FRONTEX’ discourse – from the one hand, the agency is 
by all possible discursive techniques and tools trying to shape the image of 
Episteme Discursive practice of 
FRONTEX 
Key audience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive image of 
FRONTEX 
 
 
Effectiveness of the 
agency’s activities 
Member States 
EU institutions 
European citizens 
Cost-efficiency  Member States 
EU institutions 
Trustworthiness European citizens 
Victimization of 
undocumented immigrants 
Human rights organizations 
Pro-migrant groups 
Supremacy of respect for   
fundamental rights 
Human rights organizations 
Pro-migrant groups 
Humanitarian component 
of the agency’s activities 
Human rights organizations 
Pro-migrant groups 
European citizens 
 
 
Insecurity and risk 
 
Presenting migration as 
mass phenomenon 
European citizens 
 
Criminalization of migration European citizens 
 
Constructing the image of 
“illegality” of migration 
European citizens 
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highly professional and trustworthy institution which is guided in its activities by 
the respect for fundamental rights and sees one of its main duties in saving 
peoples’ lives in the course of rescue operations. From the other hand, the 
agency is emphatically creating the image of insecurity and risk caused by 
external threats. By presenting the main source of danger coming from the side 
of criminal traffickers and not from undocumented migrants themselves, 
FRONTEX is obviously trying to legitimate its securitization practices [Leonard, 
2011], but at the same time it is seeking to indemnify itself from harsh criticism 
of human rights organisations. This strategy can be considered as discursive 
simulation of language used in the agency’s discourse on undocumented 
migration, which is intended to pay the reader’s attention to “charitable 
philanthropic connotations such as the protection of defenseless groups of 
individuals and images of an ethical politically neutral agency” [Horsti, 2012].  
In this case, the focus of attention is shifted and the issues directly related with 
border control, especially joint return operations, stay in the shadow.  
 
Obviously, this approach does not at all correspond to such requirements of 
governance associated with epistemic power as epistemic validity and practical 
reason. In the majority of cases, discursive mechanisms applied by FRONTEX’ 
experts for writing the agency’s reports, strategies and press releases are 
intentionally presenting certain issues in exaggerated or minimized light and 
thus trying to exercise a significant effect on the interpretation of expressed 
thoughts by the audience in the way, which is advantageous for the agency. 
The provided information can be neither judged as impartial and unbiased, as 
FRONTEX’ discourse analysis has demonstrated numerous cases when the 
data were manipulated in order to shape the audience’s understandings in the 
light of the agency’s interests.  
 
This regrouping of FRONTEX’ discursive practices in the compilation table 
given above clearly shows that each of them is aimed at the key audience and 
is intended to exert influence on its understandings of relevant issues. In order 
to give several examples of successes or failures (using Schmidt’s terminology) 
of FRONTEX’ discursive practices, and thus to show how constituted through 
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the public discourse epistemic power may influence specific actions of the 
involved actors, two concrete cases will be shortly overviewed in what follows.  
 
The first example concerns the discursive practice of cost-efficiency of the 
agency. Being completely financially dependent on the Member States, 
FRONTEX is consequently reproducing the image of economical, efficient in 
allocation of resources institution. By emphasizing the high level of its 
professionalism and the ultimate importance of its activities, FRONTEX is trying 
to convince the Member States and the European Commission in the necessity 
of proper financing which according to its discourse is compulsory for effective 
control of the external borders of the EU. The analysis of FRONTEX’ budgetary 
funds since its establishment in 2004 till nowadays allows to state that the 
discursive strategy of cost-efficiency and effectiveness of FRONTEX’ work is 
successful – during first five years of its existence, the budget of FRONTEX and 
hence its capabilities have grown from €19 million in 2006 to €88 million in 2010 
[Burridge, 2012:9] and peaked in 2011 with the record financing of €118 million 
[FRONTEX, 2013c:1]. This example shows how epistemic power of the agency 
constituted through its discourse has had an impact on specific activities of the 
addressee of the discourse.  
 
Another case is connected with FRONTEX’ rhetoric on respect for human 
rights, including the humanitarian component in its discourse and actual 
justification of undocumented immigrants by presenting them as victims of 
facilitators of migration. All these discursive strategies are a skilled attempt to 
mitigate the criticism from human rights organisations and pro-migrant groups. 
Taking into account the crucial role of these practices in FRONTEX’ discourse, 
which has been deeply analysed in the previous chapters, it would be possible 
to assume that this technique could alleviate the criticism. However, FRONTEX 
stays in the center of attention of those who traditionally accuse it of violations 
of fundamental rights. Thus, in 2013 the European Ombudsman Emilie O’Reilly  
conducted an investigation about how FRONTEX complies with human rights 
standards and in the special report summoned FRONTEX to establish a 
mechanism for dealing with complaints about fundamental rights’ infringements 
arising from its work [European Ombudsman, 2013]. As Ms. O’Reilly declared, 
87 
 
“against the backdrop of the Lampedusa tragedy and other recent humanitarian 
catastrophes at EU borders, it is vital that FRONTEX deals directly with 
complaints from immigrants and other affected persons. I do not accept 
FRONTEX’ view that human rights infringements are exclusively the 
responsibility of the Member States concerned” [UN Regional Information 
Center for Western Europe, 2013]. It is evident therefore that in this case 
relevant discursive practice has not been enough persuasive and that 
FRONTEX has been not endowed with sufficient epistemic power to change the 
understanding of its image.  
 
It should be clarified, of course, that these two cases (as well as any other 
example which could have been given to demonstrate whether FRONTEX’ 
discourse has succeeded or failed in promoting specific ideas and therefore has 
or has not empowered the agency) cannot give unambiguous answer to the 
question on the degree of impact of FRONTEX’ discursive practices on the 
concrete results of the actor’s actions. There are undoubtedly many other 
factors which have their impact on these processes, and in addition epistemic 
power is a very subtle for material confirmations conception. At the same time, 
as it has been demonstrated in this dissertation on the example of FRONTEX, 
the process of constitution of epistemic power is implemented through 
discursive strategies, practices and technologies. Not all of them have sufficient 
capacity to shape ideas and understandings of other actors, but to a greater or 
lesser extent through its constitutive effects they may contribute to creating the 
future.  
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